ENTITIES

By A. N. Prior

I wish to maintain here that there are abstract entities. But as it is not easy to state the issue quite clearly in those terms, I shall concentrate on what I think it is fair to regard as a key question of a more specific sort. Virtue is undoubtedly abstract, and my left eye is undoubtedly an entity, and I shall adopt a technique of Professor Ryle's and say that virtue is an entity if we may take a statement in which the phrase "my left eye" occurs and obtain another statement by replacing this phrase by the word "virtue". The statement I shall take is the statement that my left eye is not square. Replacing the phrase "my left eye" in this by the word "virtue", I obtain the statement "Virtue is not square", and I shall contend not only that this *is* a statement but that it is a true statement. I shall even prove it, thereby proving, if this technique of Professor Ryle's is sound, that virtue is an entity in the sense in which my left eye is an entity; and since it is undoubtedly abstract, it will be an abstract entity, so that there are abstract entities. And I am strengthened in my view that these issues are connected, by the fact that people who deny that there are abstract entities will in general deny that the statement that virtue is not square is a genuine statement, let alone a true one.

My proof that virtue is not square is a simple syllogism— what is square has some shape, but virtue has no shape, therefore virtue is not square. That my left eye is not square would of course have to be proved a little differently; the point about my left eye is not that it has no shape but that it has *another*

shape. But this difference in the character of the proofs that one would give for the two statements—and from a logical point of view the difference is not very great (it is only that between the mood Camestres and the mood Cesare)—this difference, whether great or small, is *only* a difference in the proofs one gives; it does not mean or entail that when I say that virtue is not square I am *saying* anything different about virtue from what I am saying about my left eye when I say that my left eye is not square. In neither case am I *saying* anything whatever about what the object *is,* and in neither case am I saying *all* that it is not. In saying that my left eye is not square, I am not saying that it *is* of some other shape, and in saying that virtue is not square I am not saying that it is not of any other shape either; in both cases I am saying that the thing is not square, and that is *all* that I am saying.

This is very elementary stuff—I am almost tempted to apply to it the mystic word "tautological"—and I apologise for so solemnly putting it forward in a learned journal. But I do not think it can be denied that these things need to be said. For there are people who do not agree with them, and moreover it is no new thing that there are people who do not agree with them. At the turn of the present century there were the idealists, people like Bosanquet and Bradley, with their attacks on what they called *mere* negation or *bare* denial. And then when it began to seem as if their position was vanishing for good in face of the solid reasoning of people like Keynes and Frege and Moore and Russell, there occurred that disaster from which we have not yet recovered— Russell sold the pass. What Russell did was no doubt done in all sincerity, and he gave in before the *only* serious objection that the position I have outlined has ever had to meet, but the fact remains that he did give in before it, and as a result what we might call Bosanquetterie sprawls over the face of Philosophy like a monstrous tumour, and on the whole the person who maintains that virtue is not square must nowadays count himself among the heretics. The current

dodge or "gambit" is to say that the question whether virtue is or is not square just doesn't arise, and it is astonishing what a number of questions modern philosophers have been able to dispose of by saying that they just don't arise. Indeed it is hardly too much to say that the whole of traditional philosophy has disappeared in this way, for among questions that don't arise are those which, as it is said, nobody but a philosopher would ask. And one only has to say that the question whether these questions arise is itself one that doesn't arise (it is certainly one that nobody but a philosopher would ask), for modern philosophy to disappear as well, so that there is nothing for us to do but shut up the shop and go home.

I have proved, then, that virtue is not square, and might well leave it at that. But it would be only fair to indicate how I would answer what I have admitted to be a serious objection (though the only one) to the sort of position I have been outlining—the objection that led Russell to sell the pass, as I have put it. And the study of this objection may serve the incidental purpose of making my general position clearer, if it requires any such further clarification. Russell was bothered by a paradox. One way of stating this paradox is as follows: If it makes sense, and is true, to say that virtue is not square, then presumably it also makes sense, and is true, to say that squareness is not square. The proof that it is true is, in fact, very much the same as in the other case. Squareness, though it *is* a shape, is not the sort of thing that *has* a shape; but whatever is square has a shape; therefore squareness is not square. One could show in a similar way that virtue is not virtuous, redness is not red, femininity is not feminine, and so forth. And this resemblance between squareness, virtue, redness and femininity may be summed up by saying that they do not inhere in themselves. It is natural to go on from this to saying that there is a property, in that broad sense of "property" which covers negative properties, which squareness, virtue, redness and femininity all share, the property of non-self-inherence, just

as virtue and my left eye share the property of non-squareness. But do they share this property of non-self-inherence with the property of non-self-inherence itself? In other words, is the property of non-self-inherence non-self-inherent? It is well known—there is no need to go over the proof—that if the property of non-self-inherence is non-self-inherent it isn't, and if it isn't it is. So that if there *were* such a thing as the property of non-self-inherence it would have contradictory properties. Therefore there is no such thing as the property of non-self-inherence. That is the paradox and its obvious outcome; and I am not going to deny that outcome—I too am compelled to admit that there is no such entity as the property of non-self-inherence. Indeed I admit it in a way in which Russell and those who have followed in his train *don't* admit it. For to my way of thinking the statement that there is no such entity as the property of non-self-inherence is a genuine statement, and is true, whereas a Russellian would call it the sort of thing that it is nonsense either to affirm or deny. And the question is, Why did Russell draw *this* moral, rather than the obvious one, from the paradox which he constructed?

The movement of Russell's thought, so far as I can see, was more or less like this. He felt that if it were really true that squareness, virtue, etc., are things that do not inhere in themselves, then there *must* be such a property as non-self-inherence; therefore it is not true that squareness, virtue, etc., do not inhere in themselves; therefore, again, it is not true that squareness is not square, that virtue is not virtuous, and so on. Yet it is obviously not true that squareness *is* square, that virtue *is* virtuous, and so on. So we must say that sentences like "Squareness is square", "Virtue is virtuous", and so on are neither true nor false but meaningless. But why are they meaningless? To answer this question, Russell sorted out subjects and predicates into what he called logical types, and argued that you only get genuine statements when subjects and predicates are matched in a certain way, according to their type. One of his principal rules might be

stated thus: Suppose you have a sentence of the form "X is Y" (e.g. "Socrates is wise"). This is equivalent to "X has the property of Y-ness", which has the appearance of stating a relation between the object X and the object Y-ness. Russell's rule is to the effect that "X is Y" only makes sense if X and Y-ness are of different logical types, and in fact only if Y-ness is of a logical type one higher than X. (And of course in cases in which "X is Y" does not make sense, "X is not Y" does not make sense either). Apply this to "Squareness is square": if you turn this into "Squareness has the property of squareness" the objects ostensibly related are not only of the same logical type but one and the same object, so we throw that one (along with its contradictory) into the limbo of The Meaningless without more ado.

This "theory of types" has all kinds of internal difficulties on which I need not here dwell; let it suffice to point out that the attempt to meet them has driven its exponents into some very desperate straits. For example, a year or two ago Professor Smart was telling us that the reason why "Squareness is square" and "Squareness is not square" are not statements, is that they are the sort of thing that nobody would *want* to say. This, of course, is just plain false; to mention no others (though I could if I wanted to), *I* want to say that squareness is not square. Similarly I want to say, and do say, and consider it to be true to say, that the fourth figure of the syllogism does not like tripe, so that the fourth figure of the syllogism and I are a pair of non-tripe-likers; and that whereas my cat is not aware of its difference from the *consequentia mirabilis* because I have no cat, and my grocer is not aware of his difference from the *consequentia mirabilis* because he is not given to philosophical reflection, the fourth figure of the syllogism is not aware of its difference from the *consequentia mirabilis* because it is not aware of anything.

However, from another formulation of Professor Smart's it would seem that he only meant that these are the sort of

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things that nobody but a cad would want to say. According to his amended version, they are the sort of thing which it is not "natural" to say or to want to say. And this may very well be true—I just don't know, because I don't understand this use of "natural". When I myself say that something is "natural", as I sometimes do (you will find the phrase being used, instead of being merely mentioned, three paragraphs back), I generally mean that it is a common and understandable human failing. For example, it is natural that the adolescents of New Zealand should behave as the newspapers tell us they do; and there are certain logical fallacies which it is natural that men should commit. Obviously to say that a thing is "natural" in this sense is not to say that it is something we ought to do. But it is not at all surprising—it is even (in my sense) natural—that a Russellian should be driven to using the word "natural" in a sense in which it does somehow follow from a thing's being "natural" that we ought to do it. For this is the way the Thomists talk, and the theory of types, or the theory of categories as it is now often called, is essentially a Thomist theory. When we are told that there is a type-fallacy or category-mistake in saying that virtue and my left eye are both of them not square, we are irresistibly reminded of the way the Thomists tell us that we must not say that God and (for example) Mr. Grave are both intelligent, because nothing that is predicable of God is predicable of Mr. Grave in the same sense. It cannot even be said (according to this story) that God and Mr. Grave both *are* in the same sense of "are"; and just this, of course, is what your Bosanquettist or Russellian or whatever you like to call him would say of virtue and my left eye.

What is the way out of this Thomo-Bosanquo-Russellio-Rylean morass? Where, in other words, did Russell go wrong? He went wrong, I suggest, in assuming that from a statement of the form "X is Y" it is *always* possible to infer the corresponding statement of the form "X has the property

of Y-ness". It is indeed *almost* always the case that when X is Y it has the property of Y-ness, but this consequence fails in those odd cases in which there is just no property of Y-ness for X to have. For example, squareness is non-self-inhering, but it hasn't the property of non-self-inherence, because there is no such property. Note here that to say that there is no such property as Y-ness is not the same as saying that the property of Y-ness is not exemplified. The property of being a fire-breathing serpent, and the property of being at once ten feet tall and not ten feet tall, are neither of them exemplified, but I do not know of any reason for saying or believing that there are no such properties as these two. (That the second of them is self-contradictory is of course a reason for saying that it is unexemplified, but only its *having* self-contradictory properties — e.g. its being at once self-contradictory and not self-contradictory—would be a reason for believing that it didn't exist). And note, secondly, that to say that there is no such property as Y-ness is not to say that statements which are ostensibly about the property of Y-ness are meaningless. There are a good half-dozen modern ways of exhibiting the sense of statements which are ostensibly about non-existent objects—Russell's theory of descriptions, for example—and we can adopt any one of them that takes our fancy, or that we have some ground or other for preferring. The property of non-self-inherence, in other words, is in the same box as the present King of France, the integer between 3 and 4, and so on. As far as the point which worried Russell is concerned, it is not meaningless but simply false that the property of non-self-inherence is non-self-inherent, and also that it is self-inherent, just as it is false that the present King of France is non-bald and false that he is bald; and it is not meaningless but true that the property of non-self-inherence is not non-self-inherent, and also that it is not self-inherent, just as it is true that the present King of France is not non-bald and true that he is not bald. It is just as simple as that.

The reason why Russell did not see this way out was, I suspect, that he was half inclined to say that "X is Y" and "X has the property of Y-ness" cannot ever have different truth-values because they are just different ways of saying the same thing. This is a position which I propose to describe as "pure nominalism". On this view, a statement which is ostensibly about an abstract entity is a genuine statement if and only if it can be exhibited as a mere *façon de parler,* differing only in its verbal form from some statement which does not even appear to be about any entities but concrete ones. Thus "Squareness does not inhere in my left eye" will pass if it is only a way of saying "My left eye is not square", "Political ability always accompanies noble birth" if it is only a way of saying "Whoever is nobly born is politically able", and so on. This criterion certainly disposes of "Squareness is not square" (for which no such translation seems possible), and so saves us from the paradox about non-self-inherence. And I should say that pure nominalism (as developed, e.g., by Nelson Goodman) is in its own way a consistent and respectable philosophical position. It has at all events the virtue of intelligibility. So often when we are told that such and such an expression is "meaningless", the word "meaningless" itself seems to be meaningless; but what a pure nominalist means by "meaningless" is comparatively clear—when he says that an expression is meaningless, he means that there is no way of translating it into a certain sort of vocabulary, which he holds to be the only sort of vocabulary that he or anyone else can understand. And the position of Russell himself sometimes appears to be that of pure nominalism (the reason why only certain sorts of subjects can be intelligently attached to certain sorts of predicates sometimes seems to be just that the degree of artificiality—of façon-de-parletude, so to speak—of subject and predicate must be the same). On the whole, however, the evidence is against this interpretation of him; and I think we must say of Russell what I believe Quine has said of himself, that he would *like*

to be a pure nominalist but cannot—the facts make it too hard for him. (Incidentally, any reader of Quine's *New Foundations for Mathematical Logic* will realise how much this present paper owes to that one, though I have not imitated Quine's odd fad of talking about "classes" rather than about "properties").

Why not be a pure nominalist? The counter-question "Why be one?" is to me a sufficient answer; but I admit that there is a certain amount of temperament in this. I simply do not possess the sheer zeal for waving Ockham's razor about which seems to burn within so many of my contemporaries; my motto is rather *Entia non sunt subtrahenda praeter necessitatem,* and even the property of non-self-inherence I have given up with a sigh and only under extreme compulsion. Nor can I understand the *fear* of abstract entities by which so many nowadays are beset; it even seems to me a little comical. I have been told, for example, that one who starts by asserting the non-squareness of virtue will end by maintaining the existence of a "State" distinct from and in addition to its individual citizens; and this may very well be the case, but what of it? Even if the State in this sense does exist, it has no particular claim upon our reverence; and indeed it would seem that if the State does exist I am in a much better position to thumb my nose at it than if it does not. But temperament apart, there is a *reason* for not being a pure nominalist, the simple reason that this theory throws out the baby with the bathwater. It may to some minds be very nice to have this short and easy way with "Squareness is not square", but the same technique will also, so far as I can see, compel us to drop such unexceptionable statements as that squareness is a shape. And indeed these two statements, the "good" one and the "bad" one, are very closely connected, for it is just because squareness *is* a shape that it is not the sort of thing that *has* a shape, and so is not square. A connected point is that shapes can be *counted*—we can say that a certain six things are all of one shape, or only of two

shapes, and so on. And although Russell and Quine do not seem to have been especially worried about shapes, they have been worried about numbers, and about the fact that there are some things we want to say about them that cannot be said in the vocabulary of pure nominalism.

Summing up, I would say that there are three principal positions which a man may incline to take up with regard to the two forms "X is Y" and "X has the property of Y-ness". He may want to say that they have the same meaning, and so automatically have the same truth-value. That is the position I have called pure nominalism. Or he may want to say that the two forms have not the same meaning, and moreover have not always the same truth-value either. This might be called pure Platonism, though I am by no means sure whether, as a matter of history, Plato would have owned it. The third view is that although "X is Y" and "X has the property of Y-ness" have not the same meaning, they necessarily always have the same truth-value. And I would suggest that the real moral of the paradox about non-self-inherence is just that this third position cannot really maintain itself, the theory of types (with its unkempt and probably unexpected brood of philosophical children, some of them like poor horrible babes with old men's faces) being a desperate but incoherent attempt to preserve it.

McKELLAR STEWART: A CONTEMPORARY'S APPRECIATION

By E. Morris Miller

1. Historical

The first generation of University philosophy teachers in Australia had come from Scotland, notably Henry Laurie, Francis Anderson, and William Mitchell, followed by W. R. Boyce Gibson with Scottish affiliations. They had felt and continued the impact of post-Kantian idealism in Great Britain, and the traditional Scottish philosophy of consciousness as latterly presented by Campbell Fraser. The English naturalism of Huxley and Spencer was given a quietus, as well as the philosophical radicalism of Bentham, Mill, and the Utilitarians generally. Associationism, which was a favourite discourse in the pre-University period, operated merely as a mode but not a root principle. The approach was decidedly rational, and self-consciousness was accepted on its own justification. The conceptions of right and good were taken to be fundamental. Active moral reason was at the core of the universe. The individual was real, and the moral personality supreme. The world as a whole was compact of relations, and motion was inherent. In man's self-consciousness the real found interpretation in terms of the relations reason itself devised.

During the first decade of the Commonwealth the Australian-born graduates in philosophy were coming to the front in their own land. The more prominent among them, though they had been strongly influenced by the rational schools of thought in Europe, were ready to follow streams of tendency that fitted in with the energy and vigour characteristic of pioneering life in rural and urban Australia. The recently acquired maturity of American philosophy was a welcome stimulus, particularly as manifest in the teachings of

Royce and James, contrary though they were as to fundamentals, but in unison on points of practice expressed in a will to act morally. This exaltation of will was reinforced by the activism or energising liberalism of Eucken, and the invigorating conception of spiritual living, or the reality of change, emphasised by Bergson. The primacy of purposiveness in striving, as a psychological principle, put forth by McDougall, was received with warmth of heart, as well as the newly developed experimental phase of psychology, which gave a fresh turn to industry and education. The exuberance of these teachings was modified by a discriminative reception of Stout's psychological unfolding of the post-Kantian theory of knowledge.

In the second decade of the Commonwealth, the Philosophy Departments in our Universities were becoming predominantly Australian in personnel, and about the middle of the next decade the heads of these departments in every university were either Australian-born or Australian-educated. These men were the products of the first generation of professors, and on the whole their teachings were rationally idealistic. Notable among them were McKellar Stewart and Bernard Muscio. Though originally trained in the Scottish tradition, almost all these teachers, as Australians, were susceptible to the new movements in philosophy that had come in the train of Eucken and Bergson. In this country John Smyth and W. R. Boyce Gibson were forerunners in these fields. The Prime Minister, Alfred Deakin, previously influenced by Royce, was also responsive.

At this time, in the political arena, the new Common-wealth had taken on an expansive outlook in keeping with the dominion nationalism, then apparent in the self-dependent countries of the Empire. The universities had broken down the restrictions of provincialism, and assumed an air of self-assurance. The awakening of nationhood was reflected in our literature which, following the balladists of the outback, had found a universal sweep, rationally conditioned in the poetry

of O'Dowd and Brennan. A spirit of self-conscious striving was active in our midst, and the liberalising trends of the philosophy of the time were eagerly absorbed.

Then came a break with the onset of the first World War in 1914. We were thrown back upon principles, or the search for them. Defence was justified in moral terms. Relativism had not yet captured the scene. But later the need for reconstruction in the face of so much empirically devised warfare, waste and destruction, had given a practical turn to re-adjustment. Leagues, when in conclave, sought refuge in generalities, but particularistic differences held sway nevertheless. Actuality took on an austere factual setting. Things were reacted to in isolation; and relationships became affairs of momentary concern. Nothing was taken for granted. Whatever existed was free to justify itself in its own fashion. Empiricism and relativism entered into a joint service. Any task to be done was an irresistible immediacy. A universe was put into the melting pot. The parts in their fragmentariness were in the ascendant. How they were to be framed together, or refitted into new patterns, was a chance occurrence. Serviceability of the finished product was the sole determining rule.

Totalitarianism, a sort of rigid massed individualism in the abstract, spread itself in Europe, and in an extreme form stressed unity as an unrelated fact. Hegelianism had been transmuted into a new empiricism that featured the particular idea as existent in its own right. Integration, or synthesis, became an affair of passing moment. The scientific approach was, in the long run, all prevailing, and philosophy was immersed in non-essentials. Discreteness was dominant. Severalty bolstered man's edifice of thought, and apartness, distinctness, isolation, gained sway in the realm once held by the categories.

The period of empirical reconstruction was overwhelmed by a second outbreak of war, more terrible in waste, cruelty and wanton disrespect for law, order and decency. The after-

math of physical warfare has become a war of ideas, and the most effective motivation lay in the direction of the strongest contenders for supremacy. Ideals have been dislocated. Rules are empirically justified. No thing or act is sacrosanct. Each exponent sets out from himself as an isolated centre. And so turmoil, the fetish of disorganization, everywhere abounds. The still small voice of the moral law has yet to make itself heard on high above the tumult. The moral personality has yet to assert itself in strength as a sheet anchor—the sole means of redemption and recovery. All along it is there—an ideal impulse, awaiting the reinforcement of endeavour.

Towards the close of the third decade, a new phenomenon appeared in the Australian philosophical sky. John Anderson came to Sydney in the form of a catalyst, and stirred up the dovecotes of rationalism; and facts, activities, events, occurrences as they happened, came forth in full splendour. Empiricism, so much at home in the after-war discussions, as we have indicated, was revealed in strength in John Anderson's philosophical lodging. The old strongholds of idealism were put on the defensive. An era of critical evaluation dawned for the world of thought in Australia. A new generation of teachers of philosophy sprang up. Among them were several non-Australians, invited on the strength of their abilities to infuse fresh strains of thinking into the University departments. The pre-federal dominance of Scottish and European rationalism disappeared, and each school of thought contended in the open arena of the *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy.* And so to-day whatever our individual principles and views may have been, we admit a philosophical advance in Australia. There are distant glimpses of the goal of maturity.

2. Early Career

We may now place John McKellar Stewart's life against this background. He was born on October 4, 1878, at Ballangeich, close to Ellerslie in the Warrnambool district.

The locality is noted for the mysterious wide-spread extinct volcano, Tower Hill, and the broad sweep of coastline washed by the long swell of the Southern Ocean, featured in Henry Handel Richardson's third volume of "The Fortunes of Richard Mahony". His father, Alexander Stewart, was born at Greenoch, Scotland, and came to Australia with his parents. He married Lillias McKellar, the daughter of John McKellar, of Ballangeich, who settled there in 1841. In 1951 McKellar Stewart dedicated a memorial porch and window of the Ellerslie Presbyterian Church, presented by Miss Annie Gordon to perpetuate the memories of John Eddington (her grandfather) and John McKellar.

For a time Alexander Stewart resided at Smeaton, in the Ballarat district, where his son John attended the State School. Afterwards, in partnership with his brother, he opened a store at Ellerslie, and, on his retirement, transferred his residence to Warrnambool.

McKellar Stewart's brother, Alexander, is one of the present proprietors of the *Warrnambool Standard*, which was first owned in part and edited by Henry Laurie. The Stewarts came to Warrnambool a few years after Laurie had moved to Melbourne. In 1883 he accepted an appointment as the first independent Lecturer in Philosophy in the University of Melbourne, and was elevated to first professorship in 1886. Laurie greatly influenced Stewart as a student and teacher of philosophy. J. F. Archibald, of *Bulletin* fame, served with Laurie as a junior journalist on the staff of the *Warrnambool Standard*.

Like many scholars of ability of his own time, McKellar Stewart began his career by becoming a pupil teacher (in the Warrnambool State School, probably about 1894), with the prospect of assistance in preparing himself for the matriculation examination. Unfortunately he missed an opportunity to obtain a government scholarship for entrance into a secondary school. At the time he was ready to qualify, the Government retrenched expenditure as a result of the land boom

collapse. These scholarships were withdrawn and not reinstated until about 1899. So Stewart remained in the Education Department as a teacher at Warrnambool. He qualified for matriculation in 1896, having entered under the heading of "private study". He received some tutoring from the first assistant, Julius Cleeberger, and from the Rev. Gray Dixon, M.A., of St. John's Presbyterian Church. From Warrnambool he was transferred to country schools at Charlton and Benalla.

In 1903 Stewart decided to give up primary school teaching, and to enter the Melbourne University. He was no doubt induced to take this course as preliminary to an application for entrance into the Presbyterian ministry. Early in that year he enrolled as an Arts student and signed the matriculation register. Accordingly, he came up to the University when in his twenty-fifth year, being nearly eight years older than the average first year undergraduate. The main subjects for his degree were in philosophy. He maintained a high level of proficiency throughout the three years' course. At the final honours examination during the first term of 1906, he was placed first in the first class, and awarded the Hastie Scholarship in the School of Logic and Philosophy.

At Ormond College, Stewart attended the philosophy classes of J. G. Latham, now Sir John Latham, sometime Chief Justice of the High Court of the Commonwealth. Sir John has remarked that Stewart was very industrious, and had a keen and precise mind. In 1906 Stewart succeeded Latham, then a rising barrister, who had been appointed University Lecturer in Logic. He lectured in philosophy to the Ormond and other college students, while he himself pursued his studies at the Theological Hall. He completed his qualifications for the Presbyterian ministry in 1908. During 1908 and 1909 Stewart was licensed as Assistant Minister to Dr. Alexander Marshall, of Scots Church, Melbourne, and adopted the then accepted style of "Reverend". About this time he married Margaret, daughter of Thomas William Bothroyd, M.A., an

Inspector of the Victorian Education Department. At the final honours examination in 1906 Mrs. McKellar Stewart gained a first class in Modern Languages, and the scholarship. At Edinburgh she assisted her husband in the translation of Bergson's French works.

In 1909 Stewart proceeded to Edinburgh University and two years later he was awarded the doctorate (D.Phil., since merged into the D.Litt. degree) for his thesis on Bergson, published at the end of 1911 under the title, *A Critical Exposition of Bergson's Philosophy*. The Stewarts visited Bergson at Paris and heard him lecture at the Collège de France. When Stewart commenced his post-graduate study at Edinburgh, Bergson's philosophy was just then becoming known to English readers through translations.

3. Critical Exposition of Bergson's Philosophy

McKellar Stewart's *Critical Exposition* is divided into two parts. In Part I he expounds the main phases of Bergson's doctrine, giving attention chiefly to his conception of spirit or duration, as grasped by intuition, and its sinuation into a space-time world, grasped by intelligence. The concepts of space and time are contrasted and explained in Bergsonian terms. In its operation, intelligence is restricted to the kind of knowledge typified in the positive sciences; intuition is necessary for insight into what transcends the grasp of scientific thought. Intelligence checks change and stills life; intuition enters into life or change, and becomes intimate with it as a changing whole. The originating, pulsating energy that is life eludes the abstracting consciousness and cannot be directly known. Its elusive wholeness is intuited by the self. In this connection the divergent lines of evolutionary development between instinct and intelligence are set forth: instinct is intimate with activity in a limited range; intelligence advances further and holds in leash the spatial form of things.

In Part II Stewart challenges Bergson's fundamental position. He is aided by Kant and the post-Kantians, though

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his own point of view is not subservient to theirs. Generally, he agrees with Bergson that scientific knowledge cannot exhaust the real, and is restricted by the concepts it uses. Mechanism is merely instrumental, not an end in itself. What lives overflows what is explained or is explainable. Bergson limits the intelligence as a process, for it may get out of control and go so far out beyond the self that it cannot get back; but, on the other hand, he lets the self go so far within the labyrinthine multiplicity of the processes of life that it cannot find a way out.

To know is not equivalent to living or acting. But on the question of the integration of knowing and acting, Stewart parts company with Bergson. His view is that intuition is an anti-rational mode of explanation, and tends to merge the self, or individual, in the changing whole, and thus ultimately negates the principle of moral personality as a stronghold of freedom. In his critical handling of Bergson's intuition of freedom, Stewart gathers strength as an opponent. He makes a masterly comparison of Kant's solution of the antinomial aspects of freedom with that of Bergson, to the disadvantage of the latter. After all, the highest endeavour that man, as morally self-conscious, may attain unto, cannot be antithetical to what the moral and speculative reason, as a maker of categories, achieves in the realm of thought and action.

McKellar Stewart takes his stand upon philosophical homespun. Fundamentally, in all forms of knowledge, there is a reference to the thinker's self-consciousness, which is compact of the processes of knowing, feeling, and willing as ultimates. But there is no getting behind the self as active in thinking and striving. The self as subject cannot analyse itself in this capacity. The subject is an integrated whole which as subject defies self-analysis. Analysis transmutes it into the object. We must simply accept this as a mystery of which there is no unravelling. We would go further and say that the mystery of the self-conscious subject as originally existing (and so acting)—individually we are ever immediately aware

of existence; indeed, we are never immediately aware of non-existence—is one with the mystery of the universe itself, as being from our point of view an "uncreated" creation. We are not provided with thought instruments sufficiently penetrating to bring the universe into anything like a complete subjection to our thinking. Even in the intimacy of ecstasy it outdistances us. But this disparity is no disadvantage to us as thinking beings. We have no other lot in life. Nevertheless, this incompleteness does not therefore render us irrational; it does not reduce our reason to unreason. How our reason at the self-conscious level can be, and is, self-critical, as well as critical of what is not-self, is not explainable otherwise than in terms of the fact itself. We are directly aware of it, even though we may not be able to "philosophise" the fact of awareness. This we simply take for granted. It is what is given in what for us is ultimately the mystery of the universe in its wholeness.

We never perceive anything contingent that is not a phase of what transcends contingency. We may .explain things by means of generalities; we do this in the sciences. But this is no explanation of how the general and the particular, the one and the many, are integrated in experience. Inarticulation sometimes is no handicap. To convey clearly the form and content of any object, as perceptually experienced, to another who has not experienced it, is a difficulty that eludes even the creative artist. We experience particulars, but explain them through universals. That the particular and the universal are integrated in any object, admittedly real, is simply a fact of self-consciousness. In other words, the elements of order or relations, inherent in reality, philosophically known as the categories or scientific concepts, are not perceivable in themselves, but spring forth at the call of the synthesising mind from which they originally came.

Bergson's method of intuition is simply a device to overcome man's inability to handle the universe factually in terms of his reason. His error lies in presuming that we must make up for a limiting of rational range by becoming suprarational

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or even irrational. While this line of criticism is correctly presented by Stewart, he is not altogether impartial to Bergson in taking him to task for allegedly not appreciating to the full the fundamental principle of the subject-object relation in any theory of knowledge that is itself rational. Bergson does not conceal his recognition of this principle. But he finds that it is not ample enough to open up for him the inwardness of reality as something pulsatingly living at all moments of time. The majesty of the masses of grandeur around us, the transcendent glory of the blue skies by day, and the awe-inspiring galaxies of stars and planets, which exemplify motion as an intrinsic factor of their existence, the staggering fact that what lives now—even the blade of grass in a slum street—has lived eternally, and finally—merely for the sake of not piling up further imagery—the infinite variety of the experiences of the self-existing consciousness, ranging from sense responses to self-critical judgment—all these prospects held Bergson spellbound. The handling of them seemed more appropriate to the genius of poetry than to the contemplator in philosophy, and, least of all, the scientist. And so he turned what Kant had accustomed us to accept as self-critical reason into an intuition. This avoided the pitfall of a reason that violated its integration by breaking itself up into conceptual relations.

It seems simpler to us not to demean the reason, but to admit that, as self-conscious beings, presumably finite, we cannot get down into, nor formulate from within, the origins of the universe, whether beginnings or endings; that, for us, being or existence is fundamentally in itself mysterious, transcending the circumference of our reason. It is what is given in and for experience.

Existence in itself, as we have said, is primarily mysterious for us as reflective beings. The mystery does not obtrude when we directly act and feel, and do not reflect in terms of reasoning. As soon as we, as selves, adopt a pose of opposition to, or apartness from, other selves and things, we

enter immediately into a realm of abstraction, and we are apt to attend overmuch to the separateness of the selves and things, and overlook the fact of their relatedness. And so relations appear to be superimposed upon what is presented in perception, whereas actually they are inherent and intrinsic. Fact, event, thing, or being, is an abstraction, if dissociated from relation; and relations are empty categories if dissociated from things or beings. Thus ultimately the real is not devoid of self-consciousness apart from which there are no relational categories. This consciousness in itself is one with the living structure of the universe. In the long run, we cease to be confounded, when we admit that mystery is inherent in the universe as real. We have no intellectual means of transcending it, and it eludes all the endeavours of science to elucidate its manifestation. Thus we, as self conscious beings, in our separateness, cannot reveal origins. We are only directly in contact with process.

Though Stewart would doubtless express himself in somewhat different terms from those in which I have propounded the problem of Bergson's concept of intuition in relation to the rational, I feel sure that his thinking, in its broad aspects, has an affinity with mine. But we cannot remain where I have left off. There is a command in us to mount on high, and find a foothold in the realm of majesty, where the glory of the unbegotten—the self that is self-created—gives rest to our reason in the act of worship.

Stewart's work marks him out as a thinker of quality. He presumes that his readers can take for granted the fields of philosophy in which he himself is at home as an investigator. But he seeks to gain intimacy with the discerning student by the use of leading phrases that help towards a connected follow-up of the trail of his argument. But he adds to his readers' difficulties by not placing the heads of contents of the chapters in the text itself. One has to turn back again and again to the table of contents to ascertain the ends and beginnings of sections of the exposition and criticism. Stewart's

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attitude is characteristically that of the preceptor. He is adept at teaching, and enjoys the fellowship of minds when all the points for discussion are gathered. In this situation he restrains enthusiasm and becomes quite dispassionate, equally ready to listen to objections and to offer an explanation. His flair for administration is shown in an impartiality of judgment, and gaiety is subordinated to efficiency in expression. While ever ready to win the confidence of students, and unsparing of effort in their interest, he invariably holds himself in check, and never comes down from the heights of dignity.

I had written the historical résumé, with which this article begins, before I re-read Stewart's *Bergson's Philosophy,* after a lapse of over twenty years. My recording of his background was apparently justified by the *Critical Exposition.* Henry Laurie's teaching at the Melbourne University was amply rewarded by the production of Stewart's thesis, and in it the influences of what Laurie had brought from Edinburgh were reinforced by Stewart's associations there.

4. Professor at Melbourne and Adelaide

At Edinburgh McKellar Stewart moved in theological circles, and at that time it was still a question whether the call of the church should not receive first preference. Previously in Melbourne he had supplied pulpits, and on his return late in 1911 he accepted preaching engagements at North Brighton and Malvern during the absence on leave of the ministers of those charges.

In 1911 W. R. Boyce Gibson had succeeded Laurie as Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy. At the end of that year the Council called for applications for a full-time lectureship in philosophy, and early in 1912 McKellar Stewart was appointed. He was elevated to an Associate-Professorship in 1921. From the moment of his first appointment he ceased to act as a minister of religion, but continued his interest in the Australian Student Christian Movement, which lasted undiminished throughout his academic career. With the help

of Stewart, Boyce Gibson reconstituted the philosophical studies of his department. Elementary Psychology and Ethics were linked with Logic in the first year; and in the second Logic was treated as a form of methodology, in which Sigwart and Poincaré were featured. Later statistical method was added. In Ethics the contributions of the Greeks were emphasised in addition to Butler, Kant, Mill, and the moderns. In Metaphysics Eucken and Bergson were introduced to offset the previous dominance of Kant and Hegel, who were still retained in strength. In the third year lectures were gradually varied to include modern movements in philosophy, with references to Bergson, Husserl, and Alexander. Towards the close of Stewart's lectureship, Stout and James in psychology were independently contrasted with McDougall's purposive process, and the then current relations between instinct and intelligence were treated in detail. The honours courses were reinforced by special assignments such as, e.g., in 1921, "Personality, its idea and its ideals", in which Kant, Taylor, James, Bergson, Sorley and Bosanquet were drawn upon. Dr. W. A. Merrylees, who studied under Stewart at Melbourne, remarks of him: "Though not lacking in depth, McKellar Stewart was definite, clear and precise, a natural teacher, a good organiser and administrator, with both feet firmly planted on the earth".

It will be seen that Stewart's interest in post-Kantian idealism—an influence from Henry Laurie and a strong feature of his own criticism of Bergson—continued to be a basic element of his University teaching at Melbourne. It was sustained in Adelaide where in 1923 he succeeded Sir William Mitchell in the Hughes Chair of Philosophy. He then became the first Australian-born professor of philosophy in Australia. The Australian Alexander had previously attained pre-eminence in Manchester. In Melbourne, Stewart had been impressed by the exemplary analysis of experience given in Mitchell's *Structure and Growth of the Mind* (1907), and at Adelaide he came more directly under the guiding light of Mitchell's thought through a close association with the man

himself.   But Stewart was no mere undiscerning follower.
What he took from Mitchell had to be weighed in his own
balances, and be independently tested by him. This was shown
in Stewart's two contributions to the early volumes of the
Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy (now the
Australasian Journal of Philosophy), "The Basis of Morality"
(v. 2, pp. 64-73, and v. 3, pp. 121-31), a criticism of McDougall's
psychology of the moral life, and his presidential address, "The
Meeting Point of Psychology and Ethical Theory" (v. 4, pp.
77-90), in which Mitchell's doctrine of the structure of the self
is stressed.

In these articles Stewart pleads for the recognition of the
self as real, i.e., as an organization of dispositions that is not
dissolved in the processes of manifestation of these dispositions
as states of consciousness. The self is in its processes but not
of them. This is typified in the life of the individual organism
as transcending the living of any particular cell, or organ,
that is part of its whole as an individual. Modern psychologists,
such as Stout, Ward, Mitchell, and even McDougall, admit this
reference to the self as a psychological problem, and Stewart
concludes that in so doing they contribute to the doctrine of
the moral self and its relations to an objective order, as the
basis of ethical theory. But he insists that this basis is found
in the universal as a principle of diversity, operative in par-
ticulars. This universal takes the form of the Ideal.

"It is constitutive of the moral self, regulative in moral
experience; its objective presence means rationality, humanity,
the aspirations and efforts of the specifically human being. It
is translated by thought into principles . . .

"It is of supreme importance to observe that as in the case
of the ideal, so in the case of the principle, we are in the
presence not only of an idea merely . . .; we have something
unique, which cannot better be described than as a power,
giving birth to tendencies which restrain this or that instinc-
tive impulse or desire; a power which permeates, transfigures,
and harmonises such impulses and desires . . ." (v. 3, p. 127.)

5. Personal Contacts

My own career has crossed McKellar Stewart's at several points. He was over four years my senior. His second year Arts and my third (1904) overlapped, but we were not acquainted. I did not attend lectures, being employed at the Public Library of Victoria. In 1905 I prepared for final honours in the History and Economics School, but did not sit owing to illness. On recovery I decided to take the School of Logic and Philosophy. I nearly missed this examination through illness. Unknown to one another, Stewart and I were contestants for the Hastie Scholarship in 1906. We were both placed in the first class, but he secured the scholarship by a narrow margin. Influenced by Henry Laurie and John Smyth, Principal of the Teachers' College, I attended post-graduate courses at Edinburgh University under Pringle-Pattison and James Seth. During a tour of Germany I met Eucken at Jena. Stewart later went to Marburg. I returned to the Public Library in 1909. About a year later I spent holidays at the Presbyterian Manse, Smeaton, where Stewart passed his boyhood.

On his return from Edinburgh towards the close of 1911, Stewart supplied the North Brighton charge. I was residing in an adjoining suburb. We then met for the first time and talked over our Edinburgh experiences. It was presumed that Stewart still intended to continue in the ministry. But in 1912 he was appointed to the new Lectureship in Philosophy at Melbourne. The final contest was between us two, but he had the superior status. I then received a research grant and worked under Boyce Gibson. Until recent appointments, several ministers of religion have filled philosophy chairs and lectureships in Australia.

In May, 1912, at an Education Conference, Sir James Barrett selected Stewart and myself to take part with Professor R. J. A. Berry in a discussion on the University and its needs. In the following year I proceeded to Hobart. In May, 1913, I visited Stewart at his home. His friendliness and merriment on that occasion remain a pleasant memory. He

agreed to act as a co-examiner with me in one óf my third year subjects and in the final honours examination. This partnership lasted for about ten years, when the system changed. He was a most fairminded examiner, generous to a fault in his treatment of the borderline candidate. He was truly a student's companion and a co-operative colleague. He never envied the achievement of another and was ever willing to express appreciation of work he admired. On the occasions of our published writings, we were mutually complimentary. In 1913 Pringle-Pattison wrote to me in glowing terms on Stewart's studies in philosophy, and I gladly passed on the encomium to him. In 1922, on my behalf, he read a paper I had written for the A.A.A.S. Adelaide Congress. Years later we became academic administrators and met at University Conferences and meetings of the Vice-Chancellors' Committee.

As an administrator Stewart never seemed to get ruffled. He combined light-heartedness with dignity. He was punctilious in the preparation of his matter, and preferred the conversational approach in Committee debate. He was not an eloquent speaker. His pitch was somewhat high and shrill, with a noticeable hesitancy which never became a stammer. In fact, this feature had a pleasing effect upon the hearer, as it was usually combined with a smile. He never made a point to embarrass one, and supplication did not find a place in his verbal armour. He sought to impress by well-reasoned argument, and had a ready ear for an opposing viewpoint. As an educational administrator he found an outlet for his cultural sympathies, and fostered any sincere effort for the advancement of the arts. His leadership among students and graduates was accepted everywhere. He was ever in demand for advice and friendly counsel. In the Student Christian Movement he gave vent to his religious principles, though never stereotyped in orthodoxy. Altogether Stewart revealed that devotion to philosophy need not necessarily lead to cloistral seclusion, but opened a way to a mode of community service, where enthusiasm and reason could unite their strengths in loyalty to the Ideal.

REVIEW ARTICLE

THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN WISDOM (II)

By D. A. T. Gasking

(7) *"Metaphysical double-vision".*

Wisdom is concerned to emphasize the complexity of philosophy, and to bring out how two puzzles, however similar they are, are never exactly similar, and require slightly different treatment. But he is also concerned to generalize about philosophical problems—to discover and describe those features which are common to large groups of important puzzles. There is one large group of different puzzles that have this in common, that they all give rise to a "feeling of taking the same reality twice over", to a "feeling of superfluous entities", to a "feeling of metaphysical double-vision" (92). In an early paper he refers to it as the "Reduplication Paradox—*the* kind of paradox in analytic philosophy" (27). How does this metaphysical double-vision arise?

(*a*) We often know one fact (which for the present I shall call the "supported fact") on the basis of our knowledge of some other fact or set of facts (which I shall call our "basis" or the "supporting fact"). Thus we may know that the petrol-tank is empty on the basis that the petrol-indicator has pointed to zero for the last mile or so and the car has now coughed to a stop. We may know that a woman is incapable of prolonged or strenuous exertion on the basis that her complexion is pale, her limbs thin, and so on. And we may know that Smith is angry on the basis that he has just been insulted, his face flushes and his voice trembles.

But the relation of supporting to supported fact is not always the same. Three cases need to be distinguished.

(*b*) Sometimes we can come to know the supported fact not only on the basis of the supporting fact or facts, but also directly. For our knowledge that the petrol-tank is empty we do not have to rely solely on the petrol gauge and so on: we can cut the petrol-tank open and look inside. And for our knowledge that Jane is incapable of prolonged or strenuous exertion we do not have to rely solely on her physical appearance; we can watch her as she tries to tackle the week's washing. In such cases we know that the supporting fact does provide a good basis for the fact supported because facts of the two sorts have both been independently observed, and because such observation has shown that whenever a fact of the supporting kind occurs there is always a corresponding fact of the supported kind. A zero-pointing petrol-indicator provides a good basis for our judgment that the tank is now empty because whenever the pointer is observed at zero we can independently observe, by looking into it, that the tank is empty. A certain physical appearance is a good basis for the judgment that Jane is incapable of prolonged or strenuous exertion (if it is) only because whenever we can observe such an appearance in a person we can independently observe a failure to be strenuous for long. Supporting facts that are related in this way to the facts they support could be described as "signs" of them, or as providing an "inductive basis" for them.

(*c*) But in a number of cases we seem to have to say that we can know supported facts of certain sorts only on the basis of supporting facts: that there is in such cases nothing at all corresponding to looking into the petrol-tank itself or watching Jane at the wash-tub, which we could call "directly observing the supported fact itself". Thus we seem to know that Smith is angry only on the basis of such facts as that he has been insulted, goes red in the face, swears, and so on. There seems to be nothing we could call "observing Smith's anger in itself", like looking into the tank, but only observing the situation he is in, and observing his bodily

behaviour and responses, including what words and other sounds are produced by his mouth and larynx. And yet Smith's feeling of *anger* seems to be something other than these. To distinguish such cases it will be convenient to refer to supporting facts which have this sort of relation to the facts supported as "manifestations" of them, rather than as "signs" or "inductive bases" for them.

(d) There is a third sort of relation between supporting and supported facts which could best be described by saying that the former provide a "deductive basis" for the latter. For instance I may know that one man went upstairs and come to know that another man went upstairs, and on the basis of this knowledge know that two men went upstairs. I may know that there are five men on a certain committee, aged 67, 72, 62, 59, and 40. On the basis of these facts I know that the average age of a member of that committee is 60. In one respect the relation of such bases to the facts supported resembles the relation between manifestations and the facts manifested. For here, too, there is no such thing as a direct observational check of the facts supported. Having read the petrol-indicator I can look in the tank and see if the reading is true. But having observed Smith's situation and behaviour I cannot look into his mind and see if those bodily indications are true. And here, too, having found out the ages of the committee members and done my sum there is no such thing as locating the average committee-member and asking him his age, thereby checking the reliability of my indirect evidence for it.

But in another respect a deductive basis differs from a manifestation. The facts manifested are further facts, or so it seems, over and above the facts which manifest them, Smith's anger is a further fact over and above the fact that he was insulted, flushes and swears. But we should hardly say that besides the fact that one man went upstairs and then another man did there was a further fact, over and above this, that two men went upstairs. On the contrary, we should

be inclined to say that in saying "two men went upstairs" we were just restating the fact that we had already stated in saying that one man went up and another man did. We do not have a further fact supported by our deductive basis, but a "redescription" of the facts which provide the basis. Similarly the fact that the average age of the committee is 60 could hardly be said to be a further fact, over and above the facts that are our basis for it. Here, too, we have a redescription. We could, for instance, very naturally express the relation by saying: "The five committee members were aged 67, 72, 62, 59 and 40, respectively. *In other words* the average age was 60".

The facts supported by a deductive basis, then, are not further facts, over and above the supporting facts.[1]

(e) There is a number of different classes of fact which we know, or so at least it can plausibly be argued, on the basis of manifestations. Other minds we know only through such manifestations as bodily behaviour. We know about material objects, it seems, only on the basis of our sensations— by how things look, feel, sound, taste and smell to us. We know about past events only on the basis of such present manifestations as memories, reports of others and physical traces such as diary entries, documents, footprints and ruins. We know what will happen in the future and know the truth of omnitemporal laws only on the basis of present and past facts and past regularities.

In two other cases we are inclined to say the same sort of thing. How do we tell that something is beautiful? We see that it has certain attributes—balance, contrast, and the like—attributes not identical with beauty, but ones in respect

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[1] Some may protest against the examples I have chosen, saying that here the supported fact is a further fact over and above the supporting one. If so, I invite them to transfer these examples to section (e) below and substitute cases where they would not wish to speak of a further fact, e.g. perhaps they would not want to claim that "No Prime Ministers are women" expresses a further fact over and above that expressed by "No women are Prime Ministers". Or is the fact that Smith has a wife a further fact over and above the fact that he is a married man?

of which a thing is beautiful. And we and others, especially art critics, have certain feelings when we look at it. It is only on the basis of these manifestations of beauty that we know a thing is beautiful. There is no such thing as "looking at the beauty itself", apart from seeing these attributes and having these feelings. Similarly, how do we tell that a state of affairs, a person or an action is good? We can see that something is productive of happiness, is an instance of disinterested inquiry or of fortitude in adversity and so on. And we and others feel approval. And surely it is only on the basis of such things that we call something good. There hardly seems to be, though some would claim there is, something we could call "observing the quality of goodness itself"— a quality distinct from disinterestedness, fortitude, conduciveness to happiness, and the like, and from feelings of approval.[2]

There are two other cases that seem somewhat less fundamental. Certain technical scientific phrases like "electric current", "invisible germ" and the like seem to refer to entities known only through their manifestations—such as glowing lights, deflected magnets, rashes and high body temperatures. And we speak of nations, such as England, France, Russia, but no one has ever seen nations as such. Our only bases for assertions about them are facts about Englishmen, Frenchmen and Russians.

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[2] I am here only giving a rough and very general sketch of a number of tendencies of thought. If one were to try to give more detail one would have to note, for example, that: (a) Some have said that the goodness of something is manifested to us only through our having feelings of approval for it and have sometimes gone on to say that "x is good" means "x is approved" and the like; whereas others have thought that goodness was manifested in such characteristics as productiveness of happiness or disinterested enterprise. Similarly with beauty. (b) If one, e.g., starts by saying that other minds are manifested through bodily behaviour, i.e, through facts about material objects, and then also says facts of the latter sort are manifested only through sensations, past, present and future, and then also says that past and future are only known through present manifestations, one is led easily enough to think that all these different types of fact are known only through one's own sensation of the moment. Along this route some people have been pushed towards "solipsism of the present moment". But people sometimes say one sort of thing about one class of fact and refuse to say the same sort of thing about others.

Our list, to date, is as follows:

Facts   known only through   Manifestations.

1. Other minds.	Behaviour, etc.
2. Material things.	Sensations.
3. Past events.	Present memories and traces.
4. Future events and laws.	Present and past facts and regularities.
5. Beauty.	Characteristics other than beauty itself, aesthetic feelings.
6. Goodness (ethical characteristics and relations generally).	Non-ethical facts and feelings of approval.
7. Electric currents, etc.	Deflected magnets, etc.
8. Nations.	Nationals.

(*f*) All these cases give rise to similar epistemological problems, or, if you like, to the same problem. The problem does not arise with inductive bases. For there we can establish that one fact is a good basis for another by establishing an empirical correlation between the two sorts of fact. We can observe facts of the first sort and also observe facts of the second sort, and so establish that whenever facts of the first sort are observed facts of the second sort can also and independently be observed. Nor does the problem arise in the case of deductive bases. For there, although there is no independent observing of the supported fact, that fact is not a further fact over and above the supporting facts we already know. But in the case of facts known through their manifestations (*a*) the supported fact is apparently a further fact over and above the known facts which manifest it; (*b*) since we cannot independently observe the supported fact we cannot establish any empirical correlation between the two sorts of fact, and so cannot in this way establish that the manifestations are a good basis for knowledge of the supported facts. The problem then arises: what right *have* we to say they do provide a good basis?

Impressed by such considerations we may be driven to the sceptical conclusion that we do not really know those facts which we are alleged to know through manifestations of them. If so, our argument will, in outline, be of the following pattern:

Premiss 1: The supported facts are further facts, over and above those facts which are alleged to provide us with a good basis for knowing them.

Premiss 2: But we cannot directly and independently observe facts of the supported kind.

Conclusion: Therefore, since we cannot establish an empirical correlation between facts of the supporting kind and those of the supported kind, we have no right to regard any fact of the supporting kind as providing us with a good basis for knowledge of a fact of the supported kind.

(g) But such a sceptical conclusion, in the case of each of the sorts of fact we have listed, seems quite absurd. We surely do sometimes know about what is going on in someone else's mind. We surely do know facts about material things, about past and future events, about beauty and goodness, about electric currents and nations. But if our argument was valid and the conclusion is false, one at least of the premisses must be false. For a false conclusion cannot be validly deduced from true premisses. Then which premiss is false?

Perhaps the second premiss is false. Perhaps, after all, there is, in these cases, some way of finding out directly and independently of their manifestations that facts of the kind in question are the case. Surely it must be, for after all we do know these facts. So there must be a direct way of looking into someone else's mind, some sort of special intuition or telepathy or empathy, whereby we can tell what another is thinking or feeling without basing ourselves on his bodily behaviour. We must have some direct intuitive way of

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knowing about material things other than the normal way of knowing about them on the basis of our sensations. There must be a direct retrocognition of the past and precognition of the future, a special intuitive way of knowing directly the presence of beauty and of ethical qualities and relations without basing ourselves on the present, the non-aesthetic and non-ethical manifestations of these. And so on. Only then could we be justified in judging of such facts on the basis of their manifestations. For we could then, with the help of our direct intuitions, establish an empirical correlation between facts of the supporting kind and those of the supported kind. And with this established the supporting facts would constitute a good inductive basis for knowing the facts supported.

(*h*) But these "intuitionist" answers, involving mysterious special ways of knowing, seem equally wrong. Perhaps, then, it is the first premiss that is false. In fact, if the argument is valid and scepticism and intuitionism are both false, the first premiss must be false. So in these cases the supported facts cannot be further facts over and above the supporting facts, and the latter must provide a good deductive basis for the former. The supported facts must be "reducible to", "analysable into", "logical constructions out of" the supporting facts; must follow deductively from them. Just as for every statement about the average plumber one can give a complicated statement, meaning the same, about plumbers, so every statement about other minds can be translated into a complicated behaviour-statement, every statement about material things can be translated into some complicated sensation-statement, every statement about the past can be translated into some statement about the present, every law-statement and every satement about the future can be translated into a complicated statement about present facts and past regularities, every ethical statement means the same as some statement about approvals and non-ethical features. And so on.

But these "phenomenalist" or "reductionist" (in ethics commonly called "naturalist") solutions seem just as unconvincing and objectionable as the sceptical and intuitionist ones. Surely "Smith is angry" means something more than any statement, however complicated, on the lines: "Smith has been insulted, he goes red in the face, his voice trembles, if you are rude to him again he will probably become abusive, and so on." Obviously it won't do to say a chair *is* a set of sense-data, for one could sit on one but not on the other. But will any more sophisticated version of phenomenalism about material objects do any better? Is there any sensation-statement, however complicated, that means the same as "There is a chair"? Can one really say that "I had an egg for breakfast" just means e.g. "I now have a memory as of egg for breakfast and if you look in the dust-bin at home you'll find egg-shells, etc."?

In all these cases we are in the typically worrying philosophical situation in which "unquestionable premisses have led by unquestionable steps to an entirely questionable conclusion" (132); one where the "conclusion is as shocking as the denial of the premisses which led to it" (M51). We are driven by the above dialectic from one paradox to another, and cannot rest content anywhere (cf. 255, M56, M58).

(i) In some of the cases, notably in the "other minds" case, it looks as though there is another sort of solution. It looks as though one could say: "The step from the supporting to the supported fact is neither deductive nor an ordinary inductive step (like that from petrol-indicator to tank-contents). But we can validly get from one sort of fact to the other, or at least to the probability of the other, by an argument by analogy". The trouble with this is that just those very features of the situation which incline us to say that the suggesting facts cannot be an inductive basis, also, when we come to look into it, make this "argument by analogy" very different from those other arguments by analogy of whose cogency we are satisfied. "Call it good evidence if

you like, call it argument by analogy proving the existence of things it is beyond our senses to detect, but notice that it is uncommonly like those cases where we say 'But it was found that here the analogy breaks down' " (M66).

(*j*) There are certain other types or categories of fact which can give rise to puzzles that have some similarity to the puzzles about other minds, material objects, the past, and so on. For example, we sometimes know that a curtain is not red. But, we are inclined to say, when we look at the curtain we do not see the "notredness", do not apprehend the negative fact about it. What we see is the curtain's blueness or greenness or whatever it is—some positive fact. Thus we are inclined to say that we know the negative fact on the basis (and only on the basis) of some positive fact. Similarly we do not, it seems fair to say, directly apprehend a general fact, such as "All gases obey Boyle's Law", but come to know this on the basis of singular facts such as "The mercury rose three millimetres". And if we know some indeterminate fact like "Smith is somewhere in the building" it is not through apprehending this indeterminate fact itself, but on the basis of knowing some determinate fact.

Then there is the case of logically necessary truths, such as those of formal logic and mathematics, and statements like "The same surface cannot at the same time be both red and green all over". Corresponding to each necessary statement there is a linguistic statement, e.g. corresponding to the necessary statement about red and green there is the linguistic statement "In English the phrase 'red and green all over at the same time' has no descriptive use". Now there are "intuitionists" about logical necessity, who claim that these are statements about "necessary connections" between "universals", and claim to be able to "see" these universals and their necessary connections by direct inspection, by a special intellectual and non-sensory sort of insight. And there are "reductionists" about logical necessity who say they do not know what people are talking about when they speak of this intel-

lectual insight. Seeing with the eyes and hearing with the
ears they can understand. With their eyes and ears[a] they
can observe the facts reported in the linguistic statements
corresponding to the necessary statements, and in so doing
are checking on the truth of the logically necessary statements
which report no further facts over and above the linguistic
facts, but are reducible to linguistic statements. Finally there
are people who might be called "sceptics about logical
necessity", who claim that we can never know any logically
necessary facts—that there are none to know.

"The metaphysically-minded person", says Wisdom (92),
"feels that the world is made up solely of positive, specific,
determinate, concrete, contingent, individual, sensory facts,
and that the appearance of a penumbra of fictional, negative,
general, indeterminate, abstract, necessary, super-individual,
physical facts is somehow only an appearance due to lack of
penetration upon our part. And he feels that there are not,
in addition to the ways of knowing the non-penumbral facts,
additional ways of knowing . . . the penumbral facts. At the
same time the penumbral do not seem to be identical with
the non-penumbral and thus *do* seem to call for extra ways
of knowing."

(*k*) We are concerned with different types of fact:
physical facts, sensory facts, psychological facts, facts about
the present, the past, the future, ethical and aesthetic facts,
contingent and necessary facts, and so on. In traditional
terminology we are concerned with facts about different
categories of being. From Wisdom's point of view the dif-
ferent types of fact are not distinguished by what they are
about, but by being expressed in sentences with different styles
of functioning, different manners of use. So, to put it in
other words, we are concerned with different categories of
statement, i.e. statements expressed by sentences with dif-
ferent styles of functioning.

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[a] Cf. Norman Malcolm, "Are Necessary Propositions Really Verbal?".
Mind, 1940, p. 195.

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Between one physical fact and another (and perhaps between one psychological fact and another) inductive relations may hold, e.g. the petrol-indicator may be a good inductive basis for the empty tank. Between two facts of any one type deductive relations may hold; a physical fact can entail a physical, a sensory fact entail a sensory fact, an ethical fact entail an ethical one, and so on, e.g. "this is scarlet" entails "this is red"; "this looks scarlet to me now" entails "this looks red to me now", etc. But between facts of different types neither inductive nor deductive relations, it seems, hold. Strict logic applies within a category of facts; it does not apply to inferences from one category to another. And yet in some cases facts of one type are a good basis upon which we can know facts of another. If we study such relations between facts of different types "not tied down by logic-book models" we could be described as studying logic in the wide sense.

In traditional terminology: deductive, and in the case of some categories inductive, relations hold between facts about objects belonging to one category of being and other facts about objects belonging to the same category of being. They do not hold between facts about objects belonging to different categories of being. But in some cases there are "logical" relations, though not of the sort normally treated of in logic-books, between facts about objects of different categories of being. And it is the philosopher's task to study these relations between different categories of being.

Expressed in the "formal mode": deductive, and in some cases inductive, relations may hold between statements expressed by sentences with the same style of functioning. They do not hold between statements expressed by sentences with different styles of functioning. But in some cases a statement expressed by a sentence with one style of functioning may support one expressed by a sentence with a different style of functioning, though neither deductively nor inductively. It is the philosopher's task to investigate the different styles of functioning of sentences and the ways one statement

may support another, even though the sentences used in expressing them have different styles of functioning (cf. M106n).

(8) *Ratiocination in Philosophy.*

"Grey, your faith in ratiocination is pathetic", says White in "Other Minds" (M86). Wisdom holds that no controversial question in philosophy can ever be decided by a demonstrative argument.

(*a*) A deductive proof will never settle a controversial question in philosophy. For "in the course of a good proof the level of certainty for the conclusion rises to that of the premisses and the level of certainty of the falsity of the premisses rises to the level of certainty of the falsity of the conclusion. When the level of the independent certainty of the premisses is great and there is nothing against the conclusion, as in mathematical calculations, then we speak of proving the truth of the conclusion from the truth of the premisses. When the independent certainty of the falsity of the conclusion is great, whereas the premisses are weak, then we speak of the falsity of the conclusion proving the falsity of the premisses . . . . Proof is like putting a pipe between two tubs of water" (130).

When we establish that r follows from p and q jointly two things happen. Any grounds we already independently have in favour of p and q then become for us also just as much grounds in favour of r. And any grounds we already independently have for rejecting r become for us also just as much grounds for rejecting either p or q or both. For if r is false the premisses from which it is validly deducible cannot both be true: true premisses cannot validly lead to a false conclusion.

There are two cases in which we would regard a demonstrative argument as a proof of something. (1) We start by having good grounds for asserting both p and q, but no grounds for either asserting or denying r. When the deductive

connection is established our grounds for asserting p and q are now seen to be just as much grounds for asserting r too. Before the deductive connection is established we have grounds in favour of p and q but no grounds either way for r; after it is established we have grounds for asserting p, q and r. (2) We start by having good grounds for denying r, and no grounds for either asserting or denying either p or q. When the deductive connection is established our grounds for denying r are seen to be just as much grounds for denying the conjunction of p and q as well. Before the deductive connection is established we have grounds for denying r but no grounds either way for p and q; after it is established we have grounds for denying r and at least one of p and q.

But the typically puzzling philosophical case is one where "unquestionable premisses lead by unquestionable steps to an entirely questionable conclusion", i.e. where we have, independently of the argument, good grounds for accepting both p and q and also good grounds for *rejecting* r. So when the deductive connection is established our good grounds for accepting both p and q become for us also just as much good grounds for accepting r, a proposition which independently we have good grounds for rejecting. So before the connection is established we merely have good grounds for rejecting r; after it is established we both have good grounds for rejecting r and also good grounds for accepting r. Likewise when the connection is established the good grounds we independently had for rejecting r become for us just as much good grounds for rejecting one at least of p and q. Before the connection is established we merely have good grounds for accepting both p and q; after it is established we both have good grounds for accepting both p and q and also have good grounds for rejecting at least one of them.

Thus before being presented with the proof—before seeing that p and q together entail r—we are reasonably sure one way or the other about the truth or falsity of all three propositions. At least we are not, in respect of any one of

them, pulled both ways by conflicting considerations. But after seeing the proof we see that in respect of all three propositions there are considerations pulling us both ways. We had hoped to settle our doubts about one proposition. Instead the logical conflict is intensified and extended to all three propositions.

This, however, is its philosophical merit. "A demonstrative proof decides nothing. The old difficulties about the conclusion will be there still. And the better the proof the more they will reflect on the premisses. But demonstrative proof is not therefore futile. It musters for us those things which tend to make us accept the conclusion and forces us to bring out those things which tend to make us refuse the conclusion and therefore the premisses" (M155).

When we have on our hands one or more propositions such that there seems to be good reason to say it is true and also good reason to say it is false, we are inclined to ask the question "Is it true?", and to feel that there must be a correct answer. What one then has to do is to give a "description of (1) those features of the use of the expressions involved . . . which incline one to answer 'Yes' and of (2) those features of their use which incline one to answer 'No'" (100). In doing so one will give a pretty full and detailed account of the use of those expressions. If, after all this, someone still wants to ask "Is it true?", his question will be like that of one who, knowing exactly and in full detail what the cow and the dog did, still asks "Did he go round her?". To such a one we may say: "With great patience we drew a pretty detailed picture of the animal you and I met in the wood last night. You recognize the picture but at once you tear it up and ask, 'Was what we saw a man or a horse?'" (M142).

(b) Another way of describing the fix we are often in, in philosophy, is to say that we often seem to have good grounds for accepting each of three propositions which constitute an inconsistent triad or "antilogism"—a set of three

propositions which are inconsistent and cannot all of them be true. Now if three propositions, *p*, *q* and *r*, cannot *all* be true we can validly argue from the truth of any two of them to the falsity of the third, and we can do so in any of three ways. We can argue from *p* and *q* to the contradictory of *r*, from *p* and *r* to the contradictory of *q*, or from *q* and *r* to the contradictory of *p*. To each antilogism there correspond three different demonstrative arguments. The typical arguments of the Sceptic, the Intuitionist and the Reductionist are interrelated in this way: they are all based on the same antilogism, the same three propositions which, though we seem to have grounds for asserting each of them, cannot, it seems, be all three of them true.

The antilogism in question is:

A: The supported facts are further facts over and above the supporting facts.

B: We cannot independently observe facts of the supported kind.

C: Facts of the supporting kind provide us with a good basis for knowledge of facts of the supported kind.

In the case of each of the "categories of being" mentioned, we seem to have good grounds for asserting each of these propositions. Yet they seem to be inconsistent. Accordingly the sceptic argues from A and B to the unpalatable conclusion that C is false. The Intuitionist argues from A and C to the contradictory of B, escaping the paradox of scepticism at the cost of accepting the mythology of new modes of knowing (cf. M106). The Phenomenalist argues from B and C to the falsity of A, escaping the sceptic's paradox and the mythology, but only at the cost of embracing such paradoxes as that "Smith is angry" means "Smith's body is angry-behaving".

This sort of situation, in which we seem to have good grounds for assenting to each of three propositions, which nevertheless seem to constitute an antilogism, with the result

that people tend to put forward one or other of the three
unconvincing proofs of paradoxes, based on that antilogism,
is not uncommon. As a further example, consider the fol-
lowing antilogism-pattern (cf. M84-88) :

> A : If there is no conceivable way of finding out whether
>   or not it is the case that p, then the question "Is it
>   the case that p?" makes no sense.
> B : There is no conceivable way of finding out whether
>   or not it is the case that p.
> C : The question "Is it the case that p?" makes sense.

For instance one particular antilogism that is of this
pattern can be got by substituting for p the proposition : "God
exists." Another results from substituting : "All the physical
evidence at time t_1 (bodily state, behaviour, the words framed
by his lips, etc.) points to Smith being in pain at t_1, and never
in the future will such evidence point to his not having been
in pain at t_1, but Smith is not in pain at t_1".

With many antilogisms of the above pattern, including
for most people the two suggested, there seem to be good
grounds for asserting all three propositions. And so you will
get the sceptic-about-meaning, the adherent of the verification-
principle, "proving" his paradox by the argument "A and B,
therefore not C". You will have the Intuitionist arguing "A
and C, therefore not B". And you will have "proofs" of the
anti-verificationist paradox that run "B and C, therefore not
A".

Here is yet another antilogism-pattern :

> A : If to know that p is the same as to know that q, then
>   "p" means the same as "q".
> B : To know that p is the same as to know that q.
> C :."p" does not mean the same as "q".

One instance of an antilogism of this pattern is got by
substitution for "p" the sentence "sensations will consistently
bear out that this is cheese", and for "q" the sentence "This
is cheese". Another is got by putting for "p" the sentence

"Physical manifestations will consistently bear out that Smith is angry", and for "*q*" the sentence "Smith is angry".

With such substitutions people are often inclined to think there are good grounds for asserting all three propositions. And so you will tend to get "proofs" of the paradoxical contradictories of each of them. The Phenomenalist will argue from A and B to the contradictory of C. The Intuitionist will argue from A and C to the contradictory of B. And some will argue "B and C, therefore not A", and thus embrace a paradox about the relation of meaning and knowledge.

(9) *The consistency procedure: Obliteration of a contrast.*

Another source of paradoxical statements is what Wisdom calls the "consistency procedure"—that of "counting as fatal in any degree what in a high degree we already count as fatal" (M185). This is the source (or *an* important source) of such paradoxes as "Perfect love is impossible", "Inductive conclusions are never really justified", "We never know what we see is real and not a dream", "Nothing is really the same from moment to moment", "All words are vague" (cf. 54).

If the affairs between Albert and Amelia last only a week or so we tend to say "So it wasn't really love, only a passing infatuation". On the other hand we don't normally say "It wasn't really love" just because the relationship fails to last more than ten years; we say "Finally, love cooled". We count a high degree of transience as fatal to the claim "It was love", but do not normally count as fatal any degree of transience. Similarly with nearly all descriptive words there is, in respect of their application, a "fringe", i.e. a range of "borderline cases" where most would hesitate between applying and withholding the word, and perhaps some do one thing and some another. Where the fringe is very extensive, as with "warm" or "bald" we say the word is "vague"; but with a small fringe we do not say "vague". We do not count as fatal to the claim that a word is not vague the presence of any fringe however small, only the presence of a big fringe. (As a matter of fact, I do not think it correct to say that *all* words

have a fringe: e.g. in chess terminology the phrase "a winning position" certainly has a considerable fringe, but "in check" is an expression with a different sort of use, and a fringe doesn't come into the picture at all. But it is easy to over-look such cases.)

If now we apply the consistency procedure and refuse to count it as love unless it lasts forever, or count as vague an expression having any fringe at all, we shall be led to say "Perfect love is impossible" or (overlooking cases like "in check") "All words are vague". This would be like saying "Everyone is bald". This new usage of "love" and of "vague" we should thereby be insisting on would not be arbitrary. "Maybe it caricatures our actual usage but it comes naturally out of our actual usage" (M185).

What is the result of applying the consistency procedure? There exists a certain range of cases that could be arranged in a series or "slide", in such a way that cases near the two extreme ends would differ markedly from each other (as e.g. "bald" differs in width of fringe from "temperature 97·6 degrees Fahrenheit") but such that any two neighbouring cases in the series differed from each other only very slightly if at all (as perhaps "viscous" and "springy"). We have in our ordinary language a pair of expressions (e.g. "vague"—"not vague"; "love"—"passing infatuation") by which we dis-tinguish cases near one end of the series from cases near the other end of the series. In the middle of the series there will, of course, be a fringe more or less extensive where we should not feel quite happy about applying either expression. Roughly speaking: one expression covers the left half of the whole range of cases, the other expression covers the right half. As the result of the consistency procedure we have a new usage according to which one of the two expressions now covers the whole range of cases that was previously shared by the two expressions, and the other of the pair of expressions is now without a use. As a result, a distinction—a contrast— that is marked in our ordinary language (by two expressions

for the contrasted sorts of case) is now not marked at all in the revised notation, for there is just one word to cover all the cases. "Vague" now comes to mean what was previously meant by "vague or precise", "infatuation" now comes to mean what was previously meant by "infatuation or love", and the words "precise" and "love" are now unemployed. "Vague" previously meant "vague as contrasted with precise" and "infatuation" previously meant "infatuation as contrasted with love", but now these words do not mark a contrast at all.

By introducing the new notation we have abolished an existing linguistic device for marking a distinction. But we may nevertheless at times still want to express this old distinction. If so, since we have abolished the old device for doing this we shall have to devise a new one "to do the work the old one did" (44). We now describe as "vague" both "bald" and "at a temperature of 97·6 degrees Fahrenheit", since both have *some* fringe, whether extensive or narrow. If we want now to contrast the former expression, as having a wide fringe, with the latter as having a narrow one we cannot now do so by calling one "vague" the other "precise". So we may very likely do so by calling the former "very vague" and the latter "slightly vague". And then, in our new notation "very vague" will mean what was previously meant by "vague" and "slightly vague" will mean what was previously meant by "precise". Our new linguistic device does the work the old one did. Similarly, when "infatuation" comes to cover both "infatuation" and "love", we shall very likely distinguish "passing infatuation" (i.e. the old "infatuation") from "enduring infatuation" (i.e. the old "love").

Propositions we might assent to may be divided into (*a*) those concerning which we have some grounds, though not very strong grounds, for supposing that we shall not find ourselves to have been mistaken, (*b*) those about which we have pretty strong grounds for supposing that we shall not find ourselves to have been mistaken, and (*c*) those concerning which the supposition that we should subsequently

find ourselves to have been mistaken makes no sense. Propositions of type (a) are distinguished from the rest by the fact that it would not be reasonable to "put our shirt" on them; the others we could reasonably risk anything on. This distinction is marked in ordinary speech by our using "p is probable" and "I am of the opinion that p" of type (a) propositions and "p is certain" and "I know p" of the rest, whether type (b) or type (c). We normally count as fatal to the claim of knowledge and certainty any considerable weakness in our grounds for them. If, by the consistency procedure, we come to count as fatal any weakness in the grounds, we shall describe as "probable" and speak of "opinion" only in connection with propositions of type (b) as well as type (a), reserving "certain" and "know" for type (c). When we want to mark the old distinction between types (a) and (b) we are likely to do so by speaking of (a) "probable" propositions concerning which we have an "opinion" and of (b) "very probable" propositions concerning which we have a "very well-grounded opinion".

The new notation, which obliterates the old distinction, will now mark a new one, namely the distinction between propositions of types (a) and (b) on the one hand, where the supposition makes sense that we might find ourselves to be mistaken, and propositions of type (c) where this supposition makes no sense. Since this distinction is not marked by our ordinary terminology the recommendation of this new notation may well be also a sign of linguistic penetration. So the paradoxes that "We can never know there's a chair there" or that "It is not certain there's a chair there" could also be regarded as "penetrating suggestions as to how (language) might be used so as to reveal what, by the actual use of language, is hidden" (100).

(10) *The philosopher's mirage: Special ways of knowing.*

For the sort of reason that has been explained philosophers sometimes dream of new direct ways of knowing things that can (we ordinarily think) only be known through their mani-

festations. People imagine a sort of direct telepathy which
would check the reliability of the behavioural indications we
normally go by; retrocognitive vision to assure us that what
is attested by surviving documents and so on really did
happen; even a direct access to the noumenal world which
would assure us that our sensations do not consistently lie.
But all such notions, promising though they may seem at first,
turn out on closer examination either to be self-contradictory
or not to do what they were supposed to do.

(a) No new instrument would do the trick. One might
imagine a "psychoscope", with clamps to put over Smith's skull
and a screen on which to see his visual sensations, or an
"historiscope" with a screen on which to see what happened
in history. What is wrong with this can be seen if one
remembers what would happen if someone invented a new
sort of thermometer, with a prod to apply to the object and
a pointer moving over a dial. The new instrument would
have to be calibrated. Thus one would have to apply the
new instrument to an object that was at 0 degrees according
to ordinary thermometers and write "0" on the dial where
the new machine's pointer came to rest; then apply the new
instrument to something that ordinary thermometers said
was at 100 degrees and mark "100" on the dial, and so on.
And if the new machine came with a dial ready marked one
would still have to check the calibration: make sure that its
readings corresponded to those of ordinary thermometers. So,
with one reservation to be mentioned shortly, the new machine
could not supply you with any reading that was at variance
with the readings of ordinary thermometers, for if it did it
would be rejected as wrongly calibrated.

The one reservation is that, although the new instrument
must agree with the old instruments over the latter's range
of discrimination, outside that range the new instruments, if
they all agree with each other, will be regarded as giving new
information not given us by the old instruments. If the new
instruments show a difference whenever the old instruments

do, but sometimes show very small differences when the old instruments do not, all the new instruments agreeing with each other in such cases, they will be regarded as an improved model. Similarly a new style microscope will be rejected unless what it shows agrees with what the old microscopes agree in showing, but if the new microscopes sometimes all agree in showing something (and the same thing) where old microscopes show nothing, they will be accepted as an improved model. But new instruments will not be accepted as accurate unless they agree with old instruments over the latter's range of discrimination. They can thus, if they agree with the old instruments whenever the latter speak, give new information, but only in cases where the old instruments are silent.

These considerations apply equally to any imagined psychoscope or historiscope or whatnot. These must be calibrated or their calibration checked. A pretended historiscope will be laughed out of court unless it almost always agrees with what all competent historians say, although if it had been definitely shown to do so we should no doubt take some notice of what it showed about episodes concerning which history is silent. We should not accept a psychoscope unless nearly always when our ordinary evidence (e.g. what Smith says) shows Smith to be seeing red the psychoscope shows this too.

This point could be summed up: any new instrument for knowing "directly" what we ordinarily know through its manifestations must be calibrated against these manifestations. It could not therefore be used as a direct check on the reliability of those manifestations in general (cf. M95-96, M110-111).

(b) A reliable historiscope will not give us a direct vision of ancient Babylon, but will give us advance information of what we shall find on the site of Babylon when we dig. If it does not, it will not be accounted reliable. Similarly a psychoscope, in so far as it is reliable, will not show us Smith's sensations themselves but will give us advance information about Smith's answers to our questions concerning his

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sensations (cf. M96). What we shall have, in fact, will be a new set of manifestations to set alongside the old ones. Besides archaeological manifestations of what Babylon was like there will be historiscopic ones: besides behavioural manifestations of Smith's mind will be psychoscopic ones (cf. M111).

(c) The readings of the X-scope are public: anyone can look at the screen or the pointer and see what is there. But suppose someone had a private sensory X-scope, so to speak. Suppose you could, at will, say by saying to yourself "Smith's sensation" or "Babylon 4000 B.C.", get private mental pictures or images like those we have imagined being publicly visible on the screen of the X-scope. Nothing is altered, except that the sensory X-scope is private to you. It still has to be calibrated. We should not accept you as having genuine clairvoyant powers unless what your private images told you corresponded with what the normally accepted manifestations told us about history or other minds or whatnot. So, for the same reasons as before, your images would not be direct knowledge of X, but another manifestation of X. If you were a properly accredited clairvoyant you would, from your image, have advance information of what you would find on the site of Babylon or of how Smith would answer your question. And these latter things you would know, if you did, through their sensory manifestations. Thus there might be a new private way of knowing about X's. "But this other way consists still in having feelings and sensations of my own and from these expecting other sensations of my own. And to talk of any other kind of knowing of anything lacks a sense . . ." (M97).

(d) Such imagined new "direct" ways of knowing turn out, on examination, to be not in principle different from the old ways. We are still confined to manifestations; we just have a new one. When the new way of knowing is first described people "may, at first, staggered by the novelty and value of the imagined gift, waver. But when they look into its cash value they will see that it doesn't differ in principle

from what they have already rejected, that it buys still only the same sort of goods" (M118).

But couldn't one, it must be suggested, some day come to know other minds, the past, the future, etc., in the same sort of way that one knows one's own sensations at the moment one is having them? This, surely, would be direct infallible knowledge! This supposition hides a contradiction. If one knew something in the way one knows one's own sensation of the moment it would be one's sensation of the moment that one knew (cf. M157-8). For (1) one supposes oneself to know the truth of some statement which is not about one's sensations of the moment, that is not subjective but objective. But "objectivity is nothing short of infinite corrigibility, infinite liability to correction from experiment" (M145). Any objective statement "makes a claim about the future in spite of its present tense" (M148). "What makes the statement objective also makes it predictive" (M151). If I say "A lake and palm-trees over there", meaning this as an ordinary objective statement, I shall have to withdraw it as mistaken if when we get there neither you nor I can see, nor our cameras record, anything but sand. Therefore my objective statement implicitly predicts that this will not happen when we get there. On the other hand (2) one supposes oneself to know the truth of the statement in the way that one knows about one's sensations of the moment, i.e. in such a way that it could not be falsified by any future sensations, i.e. in such a way as not to contain any implicit prediction. And a person's statement "involves nothing about the future only if it is used to describe only . . . his own sensation at the moment" (M151). If I mean my statement about the lake and palm-trees to express a truth known in such a way as not to be open to correction in the future, then I mean it as a report of how things look to me at the moment of speaking.

(c) People sometimes dream of an infallible knowledge of the future to be obtained, not in the way one knows one's own sensations of the moment, and not in the way one knows

logically necessary truths, but by a combination of these methods. The method would consist in making a deduction about the future from two infallible premisses: (1) a minor premiss purely about the present, involving no prediction and infallible in the way a purely subjective statement is; (2) a major premiss, infallible in the way a logically necessary statement is. But this notion, too, hides a contradiction. All inferences to the future are either problematic or from premisses that covertly involve prediction and so are problematic.

Suppose I argue:
Every X in the past has been followed shortly by a Y,
This is an X,
Therefore there will be a Y shortly,
and mean the minor premiss "This is an X" as a non-predictive subjective statement. Then neither of my premisses will contain any reference to the future. But my inference will be problematical, for there is nothing self-contradictory about the supposition that some future X will not be followed by a Y, even though this has not happened before.

If I replace the major premiss by
Every X is followed shortly by a Y
then my argument is demonstrative. But my major premiss, being an empirical law-statement, is open to correction in the light of future experience and thus is implicitly predictive.

If I replace the major by the logically necessary statement:
Every X is necessarily followed by a Y
then my minor premiss can no longer be purely subjective and non-predictive. Previously if something seemed to me to be an X then it was an X, and nothing in the future could ever show me to have been wrong. But the new logically necessary major premiss entails that the statement "This is an X" is corrigible and implicitly predictive. For, if something seems to be to be X and it is not followed by a Y, I must,

in virtue of the logically necessary major, deny that it was really an X. Hence there cannot be a non-problematic inference to the future from premises all of them non-problematic (cf. M137).

(11) *Some further points.*

Finally I should like to draw attention to, without trying to expound, a number of points which seem to me especially helpful or illuminating:

(*a*) People sometimes answer a puzzle question with "In a sense Yes; in a sense No". On the philosophical uselessness of this move and the confusions involved see M38n, 96, and M108.

(*b*) For a very clear account of some puzzles about infinite numbers, see 198-200.

(*c*) On the question "Are sensation-statements *verbally* corrigible?", see 241 and M162-4.

(*d*) On the relation between sensation-statements and material-thing sentences, see M250 and M169-170, also M42-44.

(*e*) On what knowledge is and why it is misleading to speak of knowledge of one's own sensations, see M159 and M161.

(*f*) For an account of what it is for someone to use a sentence to express a necessary truth, see M180, and notice in this connection what Wisdom says about a "contingent copy" (76, 81).

(*g*) On the difference between verbal statements and logically necessary statements, see 38 and 62. Wisdom's remarks here constitute a helpful sketch towards an account, but this is one of the places where one would like to see a much more detailed working out of the problem.

(*h*) At 157 Wisdom issues a warning against confusion that can arise from a very natural but unusual use of the word "probable". Some purely *a priori* reasoning, in which

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the premisses support the conclusion "like the legs of a chair, not the links of a chain" "lends itself to description in terms of conflicting probabilities". Misled by "probable" here we tend to think of the reasoning as empirical.

(i) See the example of the "Taj Mahal hat" on 248, and the illustrations on 264-266 to bring out how something can be a discovery, "although neither a scientific discovery by observation and experiment nor a deductive discovery in strict accordance with well-recognized customs of presentation".

(j) See 80-81 and M104-107 for an elucidation of the following point:

Suppose there is a set of phenomena such that (a) always in any given case either all the members of the set are absent or else all or *nearly* all are present; (b) every single member of the set is on *some* occasions absent when all the rest are present; (c) the presence of all or of nearly all the members of the set constitutes a good basis for our saying that a certain fact, F, is the case.

In such a case we cannot say of any one of the phenomena that it is a necessary condition for F. For by (b) it may be absent when the rest are present, and by (c) the presence of the rest is a good basis for F. And so we are inclined to suppose that the single phenomenon must be a more or less reliable inductive sign of the presence of F. (Indeed, it will by (a) be a more or less reliable inductive sign of the rest of the phenomena of the set.) This in turn leads us to fancy that F must be a further fact, over and above the presence of the phenomena, or to think that somehow we ought to be able to apprehend F directly. In this we may well be wrong. The presence of most (though not necessarily all) of the phenomena may be a non-inductive basis for our saying that F is the case.

CRITICAL NOTICES

POLITICS AND MORALS. By Benedetto Croce. Translated from
the Italian by Salvatore J. Castiglione. (Philosophical
Library, 1945. 204 pp.)

COMMENT on this book is hampered by the character of
the translation. Croce, one gathers, is a difficult writer to
translate, but it should have been possible to avoid the many
awkwardnesses and obscurities, and the general lack of
fluency, which are evident here. Thus, on p. 2, after it has
been contended that political action, being concerned with
what is useful, is neither moral nor immoral, and that this
has been doubted only through confusion of the useful with
"what is for our self-interest", we find this sentence: "If, on
the one hand, this erroneous substitution has hindered or
weakened the serious consideration of politics, *by removing*
the distinctive character of politics from ethics, on the other
hand, since the living reality of politics cannot be denied, the
substitution has led to the treatment of what is merely
political as a thing from which no one can abstain completely,
even though not infrequently it is more or less immoral"—
where the argument clearly requires that the phrase I have
italicised should be replaced by something like "by removing
from politics the character which distinguishes it from ethics".
Again, on p. 18 we have: " 'Jacobinism' signifies a practical
attitude which departs from an abstract ideal. In order to
put this ideal into effect, Jacobinism has recourse to
impositions and violence"; where something like "takes its
departure from" is required in place of "departs from". (In
the version, by the same translator, published by George Allen
& Unwin in 1946, the first sentence quoted above is recast, and,
in place of the particular phrase I have drawn attention to,

we find "by doing away with the character of politics as distinct from ethics"—which is close to the required meaning, though still awkwardly expressed—but in the case of my second example no change has been made. The alterations in the London version make on the whole for elegance and clarity, though in a number of cases the New York version would be preferable on these grounds. However, the two versions are substantially the same, and the same general criticisms would apply to both.)

The present work is not so important as the one translated under the title "History as the Story of Liberty", but it presents a similar view, and the fourth chapter, "Liberalism as a Concept of Life" (pp. 111-125), may be taken as central to the discussion. Croce's doctrine, we may say, is a doctrine of *reality* as liberty; liberty is the subject not merely of history but of philosophy, and indeed of *any* discipline—the distinctions among them can only be relative, since they all have a human or spiritual content, or, more exactly, since they all have spirituality as their content. This humanistic idealism or "immanentism", which Croce takes to be characteristic of the modern spirit, is opposed not merely to doctrines of an obviously authoritarian or transcendentalist kind but also to the doctrines of the Enlightenment. Criticising in an earlier chapter the "back to nature" view, Croce says (p. 68): "In daily life one can observe this tendency, with regard to reality, to seek the criterion for judgment and the model for action in nature conceived above and beyond history, in reason conceived as pure reason, as an idea devoid of reality, but not in reality itself, not, that is, in historical and spiritual reality"—a passage which indicates the practical as well as the theoretical character of philosophy as he conceives it. But while in this way the "Age of Reason" is taken to present us with a variant of the authoritarianism it professed to oppose, it is still regarded as contributing to "liberty and the new humanism" (p. 73). And even authoritarianism, dealt with more fully in the fourth chapter as the doctrine which (p. 113), "by

separating God from the world, heaven from earth, spirit from matter, and ideas from facts, comes to the conclusion that human life must be molded and controlled by a wisdom which transcends it and for purposes which transcend it", is not simply excluded, but is comprehended and accounted for, by the liberal doctrine. Thus (p. 121) "the liberal mind regards the withdrawing of liberty and the times of reaction as illnesses and critical stages of growth, as incidents and means of the eternal life of liberty; and therefore it understands the purpose that such times have fulfilled and the useful task they have accomplished. Here we have clear proof that the liberal concept is superior by far to the authoritarian; the latter is not able to justify theoretically and historically the former, which, on the other hand, justifies the opposite doctrine and makes it a part of itself by transcending it."

One difficulty of this sort of view is that of keeping any distinctions clear at all. Croce's contention (p. 88) that "reality is not divided into an inner and [an] outer part" is at once defensible and important if it is taken as a denial of dualism, a rejection of the common view that the material and the spiritual are different "kinds of reality", a recognition of the fact that "outwardness" is a feature alike of the mental and of the non-mental. But it is not defensible as a denial of *qualitative distinctions* like that between the mental and the non-mental, as a treatment of everything as "spiritual". In order even to distinguish in the way he does between liberalism and authoritarianism Croce must recognise the existence of, and the interest in, objective truth and thus the opposition between objectivism and subjectivism, even though he might not regard this, as I should do, as the supremely important historical, as well as philosophical, antithesis — though he might indeed take that way of describing the position as typical of "enlightenment". But he can scarcely escape the charge of subjectivism when he contends (pp. 124, 5) that "the liberal concept" can repel the charges of formalism, emptiness, scepticism and agnosticism, in the same way as modern ethics

"which refuses first place to laws, casuistry and charts of duties and virtues, anl places the moral conscience at its center" and modern aesthetics "which refuses models, categories and rules, and places at its center the genius that is good taste, both delicate and very strict"—viz. by interpreting "the aspirations and the works of courageous and patient, of belligerent and generous spirits" just as aesthetics interprets those of "original and creative spirits". For, without some rule, how are we going to have any "interpretation", to have anything but dogmas—"this is conscientious", "that manifests good taste"? The desire for concrete solutions is admirable, but it does not justify relativism or the amalgamation of what judges and what is judged.

Again, one can sympathise with Croce's opposition (p. 2) to the setting up of "a dualism . . . between political action and moral action" — between fields governed by *opposing* principles, of immoralism and moralism respectively. And one can see how, regarding the principle of reality as *ethical,* he could take politics and morals as treating the same material on different levels but without incompatibility. But this does not show how the distinction is to be made, and the suggestion (p. 1) that "political action is only an action guided by the sense of what is useful" is hardly satisfactory. (Cf. pp. 4, 5: "Not only is political action any action which is useful, but the concept of political action is co-extensive with that of useful action. Nor will we ever be in a position to adduce any characteristics which may distinguish political action within the category of useful action. If political ability is necessary to govern the State or to lead a party, it is likewise necessary to rule one's own family, to establish and cultivate relationships of love and friendship"—and so on.) One difficulty is how politics is then to be distinguished from economics. Presumably a "useful action" is one in which something is sought or demanded, and is in some measure achieved or obtained. It might be argued that a question is economic when an exact quantitative measurement of the satisfaction of

demands can be given. But since it can hardly be denied that any adjustment of demands will have some quantitative features, and since no operation of demands can be treated in *merely* quantitative terms, it is not apparent where on this view the line between economics and politics would be drawn. And if the point were that a political treatment of such matters was one in which the character of *what made the demands* (of "interests") was in question, it would appear that *ethical* characters were at least frequently relevant and important. It is indeed in some such terms that Croce comes to the conception of the "ethico-political" (in the third chapter, "Economico-Political History and Ethico-Political History"), and it would seem highly arbitrary to say that when we neglect the ethical character of purposeful activities we get the subject "politics" (more especially if we recognise the character *bad* as well as *good*), and that when, in the latter field, we concentrate on exact quantitative measurement we get the subject "economics".

I should argue, then, that the criterion of "usefulness" is quite inadequate, and that Croce's contention (p. 5) that the State "is nothing but a series of useful actions performed by a group of persons or by individual members within a group" and for that reason "is not to be distinguished from any other series performed by any other group or any other individual", would not permit even of that "empirical science of politics" which he discusses in a somewhat depreciatory manner (as contrasted with the "philosophy of politics") in the fourth section of the first chapter (pp. 44-57). It is no doubt true that lines betwen types of State ("democratic, monarchical and aristocratic") are hard to draw, that, in particular, characters which had been *thought* to be peculiar to one type are found in other types. But it is not true that such classifications and nomenclatures have only "usefulness as an instrument". According to Croce (pp. 51, 2) "it would be pedantic, from the philosophical point of view, to criticize the theory of sovereignty, of the three forms of the State and of

the three powers, of the rotation of forms, of the purpose of the State, of the rights of the citizen toward the State, of the distinction between State and government, and all the other theories", but it is not pedantic for philosophy to attack such "plans" when they are "disguised as philosophical aphorisms and taken as absolute principles". Thus it is convenient for certain purposes that "a distinction be made between monarchy and democracy; but this empirical distinction should not prevent our seeing that two monarchical States can have far more differences between themselves than exist between a monarchy and a democracy, because what matters from the historical point of view are not abstract forms, but concrete political and moral reality." But in reply to all this it may be said that it is not empiricism but rationalism that takes a certain distinction as telling us "all about" the things distinguished, and that the existence of this type of error bears in no way against classifying and indicates no way other than classifying (or describing) in which thinking can proceed. It is always possible, of course, that a given doctrine, coming under one of the heads mentioned by Croce, is false, but this means that it is "concretely" or *empirically* false and that it will be corrected, if at all, by empirical investigation. There will be ethics, then, if certain activities can be empirically described as good or bad, and there will be politics (political theory) if there is empirically found to be a certain distribution of powers (with particular *mechanisms* of that distribution) among these and other types of activity. It would be some justification of Croce's "ethico-political" view if it were found that (as I believe to be the case) a much more illuminating and systematic account can be given of "States" in the broad sense (distributions of powers, with constant re-distribution, among social interests or ways of life) in terms of a positive ethics than in any other terms; but this would not justify his conception of a single "liberal spirit" which comprehends all human phenomena——indeed, all phenomena with which men can be practically concerned.

If, then, we can still take liberty as the subject of history, this will be because in terms of it (or its vicissitudes) alone is any continuous narrative possible, and not because it embraces those things which are superficially opposed to it; and it will be possible to maintain the "historical pessimism" criticised by Croce in the final chapter—at least in the sense of maintaining that there is nothing in the existence of a period or region of "darkness" itself to show that *from it* regeneration must emerge. Croce is right, of course, in holding that such "pessimism" would not be a directive to action, and in general that the liberal or ethical spirit is not something that rests on a theory but is something that operates in its own ways wherever it occurs. Thus his "immanentism" permits of such a recognition of independent ethical and political phenomena as the ordinary type of dualistic theory (of external direction) cannot provide. It is possible, too, without adopting any doctrine of "comprehensiveness" to recognise with Croce the crudity of certain political divisions, the kinship, in spite of labels, of various institutions, parties and States. One does not require to believe in "the needs of history" in order to see, for example, such current trends of the times as are manifested in the growth of bureaucracy in antagonistic States and the growth of evangelicism in the various Christian denominations—while seeing, as before, that kinships of this kind are quite compatible with the persistence of important divergences.

The question of Church and State is treated in a rather curious way in the eighth chapter, "The Unending Struggle between State and Church". It is in accordance with his general line of argument that Croce should maintain (p. 186) that, while "there have been attempts to oust the State *with the help of the Church* [my italics: should this be 'in favour of the Church'?] by reducing everything to an abstract morality; and at other times the State has tried to oust the Church by reducing everything to a function of the State or force or economic interest", neither type of attempt can

succeed.   The argument would be that the doctrine of the
primacy of politics must in the end acquire a moral content,
just as the doctrine of the primacy of morals has to acquire
a political content.   But it seems rather arbitrary that, in
speaking (p. 189) of "Churchmen who help the weak, rebuke
. . . the oppressors, bring souls back to eternity and to God",
etc., Croce should say that "Churchmen" here should be under-
stood, "like the Church herself, in an ideal meaning of the
term, as including those who, in modern and lay society, are
represented by the worshippers of truth, by the educators of
themselves and of others, by the custodians of the ideals, by
all those who, like the ministers of religions, have care of
souls". It is all very well to consider the clash of ideas with-
out troubling about the external features of institutions. But,
in taking the name of a specific institution, "Church", to cover
the activities of all the unworldly, Croce seems to miss the
point that, by the very fact of setting itself up as the pro-
fessional or automatic custodian of morals, an institution
becomes, or shows itself to be, worldly, and that its doctrine
might then be treated as just a variant of that doctrine of
"historical necessity" in which "reasons of State" override
ethics.

A similar arbitrariness appears in the seventh chapter—
"The Bourgeoisie: An Ill-Defined Historical Concept". Croce
makes out a good case for the view that the notion of the
"bourgeois" is a product of "reactionary" and Socialist
polemics, the former amounting to a rejection of the modern
era of secularism or "immanentism", the latter to the carrying
of modern economic development to a fantastic extreme. But
it is one thing to recognise these polemics as caricatures of
history; it is quite another to extend the notion of "the
bourgeois or middle class" to embrace "all those who have an
ardent desire for the public good" (p. 181) and who shape
their conceptions and their lines of action to that end. At
the very least a thorough criticism of the notion of "public
good" would be required before this "spiritual" or "poetic"

meaning could be substituted for the prosaic or economic meaning of "bourgeoisie". (If a person like Bentham were in question, one would have to say that that very unpoetic soul had, in his zeal for public good, created a great deal of theoretical confusion.)

What Croce has to say about "societies of nations" is of considerable current interest. It is all very well, he argues (p. 54), to devise new institutions to settle disputes between States, "but it must not be imagined that by so doing origin has been given or will be given to the Society of peoples, to the unity of mankind or to the World State, because this society, this unity, this World State has always existed and is called history. The life of this *civitas mundi* flows and will flow at times in a peaceful manner, at times in a troubled and violent manner, exactly like the life of the single *civitates* or States." And again in the ninth chapter, on "International Justice", Croce says (pp. 193, 4) that "it is an error of logic to attempt to solve the moral problems of mankind by perverting the State and politics from their own nature" and that "we can understand that oft-witnessed diffidence, or at least the cautious reserve, toward international tribunals, societies of nations, and toward the appeals to men of government [other version, 'statesmen'] against the acts of oppression and the crimes that are committed in this or that part of the world. Because of the political nature of those institutions and those men, as soon as the tribunals, the societies and the urgently requested provisions begin to function, they are transformed into politics of the single States and produce effects that are at times only disappointing and deceiving, at times different from the dictates of the moral conscience, at times conforming with these dictates, but operating not from moral considerations but from the interests of the strongest States or the most powerful unions. All these are things for which it is not necessary to cite examples." It is apparent that Croce's general position, whatever its defects, is one from which he can make very forceful comments on affairs.

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The date of the original publication of Croce's work is
not given, but his being made to refer on a number of
occasions to "World War *I*" is misleading. One of these
references is on p. 145, but on the previous page, after speaking
of the unification of a great people (clearly, the Germans)
"through military power and through exalting the *raison
d'état*" and contending that such unification is less stable than
that achieved through "liberal forces", Croce says that this
people, "after a painful experience, has shaken off princes
and princelings, the founders of that unity, and has formed
itself anew with a liberal organization". This would indicate
that the date of composition could not have been much later
than 1930. It seems to me that, in any translation, we should
be given the date of first publication (together with the
original title) and those of subsequent editions if they have
been drawn upon. Also I see no reason why a translation
should not have an index, even if the compiler's view of what
is important in the work differs (as it would be bound to
do) from the author's.

<div align="right">JOHN ANDERSON.</div>

LANGUAGE AND INTELLIGENCE. By John Holloway. (Macmillan,
    1951. 189 pp.) Price (U.K.), 12s. 6d.

A LARGE part of this work appears to be inspired by
Ryle's suggestion that there has been an "intellectualist
legend" in philosophy concerning intelligent human behaviour.
Holloway perhaps extends the scope of the legend by treating
"classical" theories of meaning as attempts to explain the
intelligent use of symbols, but there are intimations of such
a treatment in Ryle's remarks concerning the phrase "what
such and such an expression means" or in his view of what
it is "to say something significant, in awareness of its sig-

nificance" (see pp. 295-7 in *The Concept of Mind*). Again while Holloway's emphasis on the place of universals in classical explanations is not to be found in Ryle's book, it may be taken as an attempt to fill out the character of the intellectualist legend. Probably any approach to this legend that there is in philosophy does call in such standards—more or less ghostly—and does not merely postulate covert thoughts and a ghostly thinker.

Holloway himself introduces the work as a defence of the "new philosophical attitude" against objections from "philosophers of the classical position". The objection he is chiefly concerned with is that this attitude offers no account of the distinction betwen the "automatic and unthinking" use of symbols and the "genuine movement of thought" or "intelligent thinking". He suggests that adherence to "philosophical behaviourism" on the part of certain members of the newer school gives this criticism some strength and proposes to give an independent account of how symbols have meaning after he has shown the inadequacy of "the established theories".

The first two chapters contain this preliminary material; Holloway examines the theory that symbols have meaning through association with mental imagery, dealing with Locke, Berkeley and Hume, and then the theory which he takes as the real basis of the classical position, that they have meaning through association with universals or concepts. Here no classical philosophers in the usual sense are mentioned. The third chapter shows "the limits of complexity which could be reached, if responding to and using language were developed only by the elaboration of verbal habits" (p. 52). Three chapters dealing with intelligence in general follow this up by discussing the relation between habits in general and intelligent modes of behaviour, but we are not then given any detailed theory of the intelligent use of language. All that Holloway provides in the way of a theory of meaning deals with what he calls "the question of objective meaning" (p.

135). The other sense of meaning in which an utterance has meaning as being intelligent haunts the book but never takes on flesh and blood. In the last four chapters dealing with language there are various references to the intelligent use of symbols but these chapters really fall away from the rest of the book. Holloway seems more concerned to give an up-to-date presentation of the findings of the newer school, or of some branch of it, than to meet the criticism which he referred to in the introduction.

A great many linguistic points come up in these final chapters, but for a theory of meaning the most promising material is found in the third chapter, entitled "Signs and Symbols". Here Holloway sets out to examine "what happens when individuals react to particulars which have meaning in some sense, but admittedly not in the sense which words do when genuinely used" (p. 44). This sense of having meaning is that of being a sign of something, as a black cloud is a sign of rain, and I should say that it is just this sense of meaning that is important for language, i.e. whatever differences we may have to recognise between a symbol and such a sign as black clouds, they will have meaning in the same fashion—symbols will be a class of signs. If we adopt this view we shall have to agree with Holloway that a word does not have some single fixed meaning and we could not make any sharp distinction between a word's meaning and its various associations for one person or for different persons. This is so since significance is a triadic relation and A may signify B to X and yet not signify B to Y. But Holloway, as it turns out, has no definite theory that significance is a three-term relation. Beginning with the notion that such statements as "A is a sign *of* B" are incomplete and that a reference is needed to some reaction to the sign, he nevertheless treats a "natural sign", at least, as quite unambiguously a sign of some second thing (suggesting that "A is a sign of B" *is* a complete statement); also he introduces such phenomena as plants growing towards the light as relevant to

significance though nothing is mentioned of which the light would be a sign for the plant (suggesting that it is statements such as "A is a sign *to* X" which need to be filled out by reference to X's reacting or responding to A). What he provides is a thoroughly ambiguous treatment both of "significance" and of "transferring a response", for he goes on to use the terminology of "stimulus", "response" and "conditioning" to "analyse the process of reacting to a sign" (p. 46) and to contend that " 'transferring a response' to a new stimulus is another way of describing the most rudimentary form of interpreting a sign" (p. 47). Then what is developed from this in relation to language is just that "habits in which a word or set of words is either stimulus, or response, can be formed in the same way as other non-verbal habits" (p. 51). Holloway indicates that a person might produce a complicated and sensible utterance although "each part of the series of word-noises which he uttered was a response to the stimulus of what he had already said" (p. 53). Here it is really words as signs of other words that come to the fore and little is said about the more common use of words where words are signs of the non-verbal. Equally the question whether some understanding as well as some use of words could be ascribed to habit is left in some obscurity since, as Holloway says, "we have not yet decided whether a distinction between 'hearing and responding' and 'really understanding' ought sometimes to be made or not" (p. 52), though some decision on this matter seems involved in the treatment that Holloway has given of significance, the decision at least that "really understanding" is only some type of responding.

Holloway, I suggest, arrives at his theory of significance by filling out, in terms of a certain view of knowing (or of understanding), the confused notion that A is a sign of B only when someone knows that B is the meaning of A. It is clearly impossible to say that knowledge of a relation of significance by some person *enters into* that relation, so that this view, however knowing is interpreted, would not make

significance a triadic relation.   At best we could say that
the relation of significance is always followed by someone's
knowledge of it, but this leaves it possible that the relation
itself is a simple one between two things, sign and meaning,
and does not have knowledge entering into it at all. Holloway
says, "it is incomplete to speak merely of one event being a
sign of another; we must refer to some individual, who 'grasps'
or 'knows' or at least is 'responsive' to the meaning of the
sign, and who interprets it or at least reacts in some way to
its significance. Were this implication not present 'being a
sign of' would mean the same as 'being causally associated
with'" (p. 45). Now the expression "knows . . . the meaning
of the sign" *could* just be used to convey that there must be
someone who knows the thing which is the meaning when he
knows the thing which is the sign—although he might know
no relation between these two things—but anyone who held
definitely that there is no simple relation of significance or
meaning between two things would avoid this ambiguous
expression and would make clear the extent of the knowledge
which is taken to form part of the relationship. One way of
doing this would be to say that "being a sign of" *does* convey
little more than causal association, but that this association
holds between someone's *thinking* of that which is a sign and
his *thinking* of that which is signified — here I am using
"thinking" to cover the observation of a sign. Or we could
bring out the presence of persons in the relation by saying that
A is a sign of B when and only when A and B are 'associated
in someone's mind', when and only when there is someone
who tends to think of B when he thinks of A. These ways of
putting the matter may need refining but at least they do
not suggest that significance contains within itself recog-
nition *of itself* and so they do not confuse the two views that
significance is a two-term relation and that it is one with
three terms. I should allow of course that there is a sense
of "meaning" or "significance" in which it is a two-term rela-
tion, and there may be one in which it is not a relation at

all, but Holloway's remark about incompleteness shows that he is not concerned with such senses.

From the final sentence of the quotation it appears that Holloway takes causal association between two things to be necessary (though not sufficient) for one being a sign of the other. But any connection at all between two things seems capable of leading to one being a sign of the other, and one type of connection which is obviously relevant to many signs is the association or connection of two things within some operation or, adapting a phrase from Holloway, within some manner of behaving. It is a commonplace that certain things have very different meanings for different sets of people as a result of their engaging in different pursuits, but it is worth repeating this in opposition to Holloway's notion that some way of behaving results from or is a part of—as was indicated above there is ambiguity in his theory here—something's being a sign of another thing. Of course if two things A and B were associated in an activity Z it might happen that A became a sign of Z just as it did of B, but this is not what Holloway has in mind. He thinks that there is "a regular concomitance between sign and signified, a regularity which need not be entirely without exception but . . . must be sufficiently marked to induce a corresponding regularity of behaviour on the part of whoever or whatever interprets the event as a sign. At the simplest level, we interpret a sign when, on observing it, we behave somewhat as we would on observing what it signifies" (p. 45). Vague as Holloway's position is here, it seems to me untenable. We cannot, e.g., specify some way of reacting to observing rain which could be called a "regular" reaction or in Holloway's later phrase "behaving in a manner more or less appropriate to" (p. 47) this event. We could not then find any definite "response" to observing black clouds by reference to which we could fill out the statement that a black cloud is a sign of rain. It is true of course that it is by reference to "behaviour" in a sense that we should fill out that statement, but the behaviour

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in question would just be the thinking of rain on thinking of black clouds. This is not to say that anyone *just* thinks of rain or carries out some covert action of thinking of rain which could only be "expressed" by overt behaviour. My thinking of rain on Tuesday may be a part of my shutting the windows, not something that precedes and regulates that activity, but recognising this we still do not require to reduce thinking of rain to any such specific mode of behaviour, nor to any set of such modes of behaviour, even supposing that we could mark off thinking of rain by any such set.

We might expect the coupling of signs and symbols to be accompanied by a definitely anti-conventionalist theory of language—which could, of course, still recognise the human and more especially the social character of language. But Holloway's position is anti-conventionalist and anti-intellectualist only by contrast with rather extravagant theories. Thus towards the close of the third chapter he rejects the view that there is a ."fundamental" difference between sign and symbol which would rule out the evolution of the employment of symbols from responsiveness to signs. That evolution is supported against the view that an innate idea of symbolisation must come to fruition before a person can, properly speaking, use *language*. However his point is just that a symbol may quite well be used by someone ignorant of the word "symbol" and that there is no empirical evidence that he would then be operating with some corresponding idea of "symbolhood". This leaves us with the question of the origin of symbols or of symbolising, and on this Holloway's position is clearly incomplete. He says that "a single word-noise really becomes a word, if someone asserts that for him it is a symbol or is part of a language (which means that he prescribes rules for its use)" (p. 56). As contrasted with the other view this takes an understanding of symbolhood to be derived from language, not mysteriously brought to it, but it leaves symbolising itself, or language, as something mysteriously produced by fiat. Holloway says sensibly enough that a word is

a symbol not because of any intrinsic property of meaning
nor because of any special relation to other objects, but
because it does or would "stand in certain quite elaborate
relations to one or more persons" (p. 56). But the standing
of the words in this set of relations is then taken to be
established by the prescription of a language rule, whereas,
even where there is a developed language in question and we
could sensibly speak of "students of the language" who go in
for such legislation, the prescription would in general be
something subsequent to the appearance of the sound as a
symbol. Holloway himself indicates in a bracket that the
prescription does its establishing "in a somewhat ambiguous
way" (p. 56) and we might be prepared to treat his emphasis
here on prescription as mere polemical extravagance, but
then we find this view, that symbols are endowed with meaning
by *rules,* recurring in the book; we find too that the later
remarks on "objective meaning", in which Holloway seems
to recognise limits to the establishment of meanings by
prescription, are such a tissue of qualifications that nothing
definite emerges from them.

Even if Holloway does not wish to present a conven-
tionalist theory of language, he succeeds in presenting no
other, and the difficulty is that he is trying to spin a theory
of language out of extremely general considerations con-
cerning human behaviour. It is a refrain in the last four
chapters and the 'moral' of the book that using language is
just one form of behaviour on a level and continuous with
other forms of human behaviour, but Holloway's sense of
continuity seems confined to the various activities of an
individual. Even when he is indicating that an utterance of
symbols often means what it does as part of some wider situa-
tion, it is just non-verbal strands of the speaker's behaviour
that he considers; there is no suggestion that there may be
understanding in spite of vagueness of language, when the
vague language appears as part of an activity common to the
speaker and the interpreter. Holloway deals with the way in

which "non-verbal aspects of behaviour . . . can modify the
intrinsic sense of words, or cancel or supplant them" and
also with a class of utterances, including utterances that
involve Russell's "egocentric particulars", of which he says:
"Here the verbal strand is indeterminate in a way which no
verbal addition could remedy" (p. 116). He accuses Russell
of trying to discuss sentences containing egocentric words *"in
vacuo,* without considering the circumstances in which they
are used on this or that occasion" (p. 117), but clearly that
sort of consideration itself is not sufficient for dealing with
these words, such words as "I", "this", "now", etc. Holloway
is content to take a particular utterance of "this is a penny"
and to say that "the meaning of the utterance is made deter-
minate, because it is accompanied by a gesture of pointing,
in conjunction with which it has to be interpreted" (p. 117).
He simply drops the question of the meaning of the word
"this", and that can be connected with the actual narrowness
of his own approach, with his failure to consider either how a
person learns to use such a word or how the word comes to
have the force that it does in our language.

Considering the general question of the learning of a
language we find that Holloway has only the most general
observations to make. Thus in the third chapter he indicates
at best that word-noises as well as non-verbal things may in a
more or less automatic way become signs of other things to a
person in the course of his history. He is presumably con-
cerned especially with word-noises that have a *common*
meaning but he indicates no difference between learning such
a common meaning and 'learning' some private meaning of a
word-noise. His point is just that linguistic activity is not
"privileged", not exempt from the formation of habits, and the
learning of a language is really left in a vacuum, not pre-
sented as something bound up with other specific activities of
the child or with non-linguistic activities on the part of the
'teacher'. Here of course Holloway takes for granted the
existence of a developed language and its use by people

associated with the child (or whoever it is that is learning the language in this automatic way), and this is fair enough when the question is just 'how is a certain language learned by an individual?' Still that question could be put in this way: 'how does a developed language extend to a further individual?' or 'how does a certain symbol which means the same thing to a multiplicity of people come to mean this for a further person?' To deal with the learning of a language we should need actually to introduce more psychological detail than Holloway provides but we should also need to consider to some extent this *background* of language which cannot be dealt with just in psychological terms. Again, if we are to have a theory of language we cannot all the time assume the existence of a developed language, or just leave aside the question how a language develops. Some of the conceptualists so despised by Holloway probably took languages to be instituted by God, a procedure which poses that question even if it does not provide a satisfactory answer. Holloway nowhere explicitly deals with it but there are in his discussions various suggestions of an answer—one of them the conventionalist view—none of which are satisfactory.

Taking the question concerning the development of a language to be, how does a language become a systematic thing, we notice that Holloway is, finally, very much concerned to stress the ambiguity and lack of system in ordinary language, suggesting that he would 'answer' the question by repudiating it. He argues that the precision of "sub-languages" (e.g. chess-notation) depends on their users proceeding with a certain arbitrariness, and links the contrasted vagueness of ordinary language with the fact that it is just one form of human behaviour, not something unique. What philosophers *discover* in ordinary language is a complete absence of system, and although they may invent or construct various strata by *prescriptions*, they cannot completely systematise language. Altogether in these last two chapters Holloway seems well aware that things cannot be done by mere fiat. I suggest,

however, that he is exaggerating the ambiguity and lack of
system in ordinary language. He is simply wrong in some of
his contrasts between the use of certain words in logic and in
ordinary speech, unless of course we include under ordinary
speech any and every verbal procedure which happens to work.
An example of this is what he says about the ambiguities of
"or" in ordinary speech. As he says "the only possibility
excluded by the disjunction 'a V b' is 'not-a and not-b' ". He
then discusses the statement which could appear on an exam-
ination paper that "candidates may submit translations from
Latin or from Greek", and says that this may be given any
one of four different interpretations, concluding that "we may
use 'or' in ordinary language, either to make any restriction
we care to choose, or to indicate that there are no restrictions
whatsoever" (p. 147). Seeing that the word "may" indicates
the *denial* of a certain restriction and that the statement
given tells us nothing at all about what the candidates must
do or must not do, the first three interpretations which say
that certain things must or must not be done are not proper
interpretations of the statement. It tells us merely that it
is false that candidates must not offer Greek translations and
must not offer Latin translations, or that it is false that all
successful candidates are non-translators from the Latin and
non-translators from the Greek.

The discussion mentioned above is especially questionable
(and I think confused) but there are many contentions in this
chapter on "Ambiguity in Language" that one might query
without being ready to adopt any simple theory of meaning
in terms of concepts. There is just as much need for a critical
attitude to talk of the "vagueness and flexibility in the
meanings of the empirical-concept words" or of "indeterminacy
in the uses of logical words" (p. 151) in ordinary language
as to attempts to present this language as perfectly simple
and precise. And when Holloway finds such great vagueness
and indeterminacy in ordinary speech it is difficult to see how
he can offer even a theory concerning the bringing forward

of "criteria of usage" in such a way as to "adumbrate the scope" of a term. At this stage Holloway is ostensibly examining in greater detail "the correlation between utterances and what were called, above, their 'objective' conditions" (p. 137), but I should say he presents language in such a way that it is really impossible to talk at all of objective conditions of utterances. And the general account which Holloway gave earlier of "objective meaning" simply indicates that he is aware of some problem here and is not prepared to say that utterances have meaning only in the sense of being intelligent. From the earlier historical material one might easily decide that he cut the knot in that way, but he does distinguish the two senses of meaning, though without making it at all clear what "objective meaning" is. He tries to link this feature of utterances with the "practical" nature of using language, but he looks upon this in a completely individualist way, as though language were an instrument which each individual uses in an attempt to deal with the things and the people around him; he can then only make vague references of a quantitative kind in attempting to cover the existence of signs which have common meanings. We are told that "to fulfil their functions, the combinations of words that occur in utterances must, often enough, be somehow correlated with objects. These correlations exist in the form of average tendencies that run through the fluctuating and multifarious patterns of the total use of words by a social group" (p. 132). As the paragraph progresses we are swamped with qualifications and I am quite unable to see from it what objective meaning is supposed to be.

It is of interest that Holloway does allow in this chapter that philosophers, in studying the meaning of an utterance, would be "entitled to confine their attention to what might be called the question of objective meaning, if they chose". He immediately contends that "many of those anxious to claim the privilege of choosing this question have really turned to another . . . to the question how utterances could have meaning

in the sense of being intelligent" (p. 135), but the passage
shows that he has at least momentarily considered the possi-
bility that the classicists were not concerned with the question
of intelligent utterance. This possibility is never mentioned in
the detailed historical discussion. The British empiricists are
examined in a more straightforward way as trying to deal
with objective meaning, but Holloway has some curious inter-
pretations even of them, connected no doubt with his treatment
of the classicists. He takes as important the challenging by
Berkeley and Hume of "Locke's assumption that the 'significa-
tion' of a word was some single entity which the word named"
(p. 15), but he does not recognise Locke as a conceptualist.
Locke is not unambiguously a conceptualist and at times seems
to anticipate Berkeley's view of general ideas and names.
Still what Holloway calls his view of "truncated or schematic
images, left behind after a process of eliminating fortuitous
characteristics from many particular images" (p. 2) is a view
that some ideas are quite general in content and is a view
of concepts. Again even when Locke is not dealing with
abstract ideas he is sometimes close at least to conceptualism,
e.g. in distinguishing ideas of modes from ideas of sorts of
substances. Holloway is chiefly concerned with Locke as seen
by Berkeley but even so it is not obvious to me that "as
Berkeley interprets Locke's theory, the entities which provide
meanings for general terms are images" (p. 2) or that
"Berkeley clearly used the word 'idea' to mean what 'image'
means to-day" (p. 4). Berkeley distinguishes within ideas
between sensations and images and although when he talks
of the abstracting which we *can* do, he is concerned with
imagination, his point against Locke is just that any idea
(even an image resulting from this abstraction) is *particular*.
Later Holloway refers to Reid as a conceptualist who would
have brought against Locke a different criticism from that of
Berkeley, the criticism that he wrongly took general ideas as
images, but whatever view Reid took of Locke he clearly is
a conceptualist. The difficulty about this from Holloway's point

of view would be that Locke tries to link concepts with experience and so cannot be fitted into the conceptualism which Holloway envisages.

If we try to disentangle from Holloway's account of the classicists the points that would belong to their theory of objective meaning, the one point that emerges definitely is again that a single entity was set up as what each word signifies. Now many conceptualists, including Locke, cannot unambiguously take up this position, because the concepts they recognise are still in a way particular ideas, and they would need to recognise a variety of them in connection with any given word. If your concept of a triangle can be distinguished from mine, then neither of these can be a concept providing a single meaning for the word "triangle". Unless a conceptualist is definitely a rationalist and more concerned with concepts in a divine understanding than with human concepts, he can say at the most that there is some single entity, a concept, which each word signifies *for a particular person*. Holloway indicates but does not stress this point, and cannot very well do so if he is not prepared "to make any assertions about the constituents or nature of consciousness at all" (p. 37). Equally he cannot make the point that a concept in a human mind could not be any common meaning for a word, could not be even one out of several things signified by a word to several groups of people. Holloway is always vague on the question of common meaning and his objection is concerned with the notion of a single word rather than with that of a single thing signified. There cannot, he argues, be a "simple one-one relation" of naming because "there is no single entity which is the name of anything which has a name; . . . To use the 'same word' again, in the sense in which that is possible, is to produce another noise or mark which is always numerically different, and usually different in quality, from the former" (pp. 22, 23). This points, no doubt, to a criticism of some theories of universals as meanings of words, but on the face of it it might well be welcomed by

some such theories. A believer in 'universals' does not *have* to make a distinction between two classes of objects, particulars and universals, and does not then need to take universal meanings as signified by purely particular words. On the other hand, if Holloway finds some problem in talking of the "same word" and wants to proceed just in terms of "individual and unique" noises or marks, then it is not surprising that he cannot get anywhere with objective meaning.

Of the classical theories it is conceptualism that Holloway is most concerned to attack and there is certainly room for an examination of conceptualism. I should agree that it is "deeply embedded in the thoughts and writings of philosophers and non-philosophers alike" (p. 33) but this makes it the more important to search out philosophical statements of it and not to import into these some unsupported use or purpose. Conceptualism is represented in Holloway's work by a few quotations, all from recent writers and some only detached sentences. In none of these is there any reference to intelligence, but Holloway lays it down that concepts are introduced "to explain how verbal sequences and utterances could sometimes constitute processes of genuine and intelligent thought" (p. 37). His 'conceptualism' then cannot be of the type which does, I think, often appear as a sort of 'common-sense' assumption, what might be called 'empirical' or Lockean conceptualism. This is itself a mixed view containing some rationalist elements but it does not contend that "one could learn the meanings of every word for an empirical quality or type of real object without recourse to experience" (p. 41). Such a contention would be made only in a more decidedly rationalist theory of concepts, though it is not a typical rationalist view—a rationalist would not want to set up concepts for every word. What Holloway presents is a hybrid view and one which takes no account of those suggestions in some rationalist theories that a concept may be open to inspection by various minds, may be a divine concept capable of functioning as a common and fixed meaning for men's

utterances. Such a conceptualism could easily treat both the origin and the learning of a language in a quite unhistorical way, but it has some value nevertheless by contrast with an unexamined individualism in regard to language. I am doubtful also whether conceptualism (even that of the rationalist variety) is always such a theory of universals as Holloway suggests, whether all particular things are taken to "instantiate" concepts. Holloway's account makes the guidance by a concept of an intelligent uttering of a proposition something of an indirect kind, a matter of our recognising the concept which the subject does "instantiate". But some conceptualists hardly distinguish between our proposing and what we propose, so that if there were a question of some guidance by a concept the particular related to the concept would probably just be our particular activity of proposing. The view sometimes encountered that a concept is a rule of procedure suggests this type of position.

In the philosophic tradition we do find theories in which universals can be said to function partly as explaining the "distinguished" character of some apprehension of particular things, but it is another question whether this "distinguished" character is taken as a matter of intelligence either in verbalising or in thinking. There is, I think, little to be said for the view that philosophers have been greatly interested in studying the intelligent use of language. It can only appear to be so if we neglect the fact that phrases like "a mere noise" or "a reflex noise" may be used in quite distinct contrasts. There is more force in the contention that distinctions commonly made between grades of thinking or theorising amount to a distinction between intelligent and unintelligent thinking. Thus Descartes, in the *Discourse*, might be said to have an ideal of 'cleverness' in theorising; he certainly shows little appreciation of what the plodder or the wild speculator might contribute to the advance of theory. But we notice that Holloway, to the extent that he takes intelligent thinking as what philosophers have tried to explain

by referring to universals or concepts, spoils the picture which he takes over from Ryle and gets into tangles and contra-dictions. When he deals with theories of intelligence in general he says that "thinking could in one way or another be intelligent without a problem arising; but overt bodily activity could not" (p. 76). This is in accord with Ryle's account of the "intellectualist legend" but does not fit in with Holloway's treatment of classical theories as precisely concerned to explain intelligent thinking by reference to universals or concepts. Similarly the classical theories of verbal intelligence (which Holloway sometimes identifies with theories about thinking, by confining covert thinking to concepts) do not fit into the pattern of the "intellectualist legend". The thoughts that, on Holloway's account, are relevant to intelligent utter-ance, are not thoughts concerning the overt utterings, as the general theory would require, but simply thoughts of uni-versals or concepts. At one point in dealing with intelligence in general Holloway seems to have envisaged a filling out of the legend by the treatment of universals as the final explana-tions offered for all intelligent behaviour. He speaks of the explanatory mental activity having "ultimately to be validated in its turn by reference to those incorrigible mental entities, 'meanings' and 'concepts'" (p. 77). But no coherent inter-pretation is worked out along these lines. To get a single picture of theories of intelligent overt activities by adding universals to Ryle's account, Holloway would need also to modify his presentation of the theories concerning the intelli-gent use of symbols. Thinking about the overt activity of symbol-using would have to be introduced as well as concepts, but the general plan of the book seems to require the view that symbol-using was given a special privileged position amongst overt activities by the classicists.

It is not clear how Ryle or Holloway would take the "intellectualist legend" to be related to a doctrine of rational explanations, but various criticisms made by Holloway require for their cogency that the theory criticised be one that

demands 'reasons' and is not satisfied with matter of fact explanations. The main part of any existing intellectualist legend is probably a rationalist theory of explanation which as applied to the mental easily leads to intellectualism. I should say that there is also a sort of vicious intellectualism just in the acceptance of the distinction between intelligent and unintelligent modes of behaviour, the treatment of this as obvious and needing no examination, though particular theories of it do. But whatever we think of the general notion of an intellectualist legend, it is at least not illuminating in this work of Holloway. Nor does he get anywhere in the central chapters in dealing positively with intelligence. And if it is true, as he says in the Introduction, that "no criticism, even implicit, is made of the empirical work of psychologists, save where they have incorporated into it the classical position of philosophy" it is also true that a great deal of empirical work which would seem relevant to the discussion of intelligence, and which is not obviously at least vitiated by the "classical" philosophy, is left out of account. Holloway, one suspects from his omissions, is still a behaviourist though perhaps not given to "philosophical behaviourism".

A. R. WALKER.

REVIEWS

The purpose of this study is to explain why we take pleasure in the pleasure peculiar to tragedy. The author attempts to accomplish this task by tracing the long history of the "paradox of the fortunate fall". This paradox is the fact that men can obtain a boon through suffering. This observation is not new; but the main value of the book is in the way in which the author has traced the treatment which this insight has received from the stone-age down to the novels of Thomas Mann and James Joyce. There are copious quotations from original texts and a thorough presentation of the conclusions reached by such scholars as Frankfort, Hooke, Farnell, Miss Harrison and a host of others. The picture which emerges is one of a constant reinterpretation of the theme "if winter comes, can spring be far behind?"—the dead god lives again; man falls, but not in vain. After chaos comes order, and redemption is due to passion; this is one of the "most tenaciously held faiths which man has ever grasped".

There are several points which provoke criticism. The author has, I think, given way to the temptation to see the death-rebirth pattern everywhere. It is indeed the most significant and fundamental rhythm of nature. But just for that reason it does not mean very much if we find people preoccupied with it, unless we are very sensitive to the different meanings they attribute to it. The author, however, is in several minds as to whether it has one or many meanings. In several places he says that this pattern is so significant because, by mimetically reproducing it, men hope to control nature and destiny. In the first chapter there is a psychological explanation of its appeal; and yet the author also explains that in every stage of its development the pattern had its own meaning which became more and more spiritualised until it finally culminated in Shakespearean tragedy. Furthermore, I find it difficult to agree that the pattern is really paradoxical. The author writes that according to the evidence of our senses there is only death and that the belief that after death there is a birth has no logic and is therefore paradoxical. I would reply that it always depends on what evidence one chooses to consider: there is nothing paradoxical in the experience that we may attain an

unlimited sense of freedom and peace through sacrificing our closest
and dearest attachments. Such sacrifice entails suffering and is there-
fore an instance of the death-rebirth pattern.

Finally, there is a historical problem over which I would quarrel
with the author. The evolution of Hebrew thought is represented as a
deepening of the meaning of the pattern. It cannot be denied that
early Hebrew ritual shared in the pattern. But it seems that the
distinctive feature of the evolution of Hebrew religion is the desire
to get away from it—and I cannot help feeling that the author's own
long quotations in Ch. V bear out this very point. It would therefore
be wrong to conclude, as the author does, that the Semitic and
Hellenistic varieties of the pattern coalesced in the rise of Christianity.
On the contrary, the Hellenistic ascendancy over early Christian
thought successfully undid all Hebrew efforts to get away from the
idea that a boon can result from the death of a god. The Ebionites
were true Jewish disciples of Jesus in that they refused to be
hellenised. They followed in His steps without capitulating to the
death-rebirth interpretation of His life.

In spite of these criticisms this is a useful book which makes
available much material buried in the forbidding tomes of specialists.

P. MUNZ.

INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC. By Irving M. Copi. (The Macmillan Company,
1953. xvi + 472 pp.)

This elementary textbook has three main parts: (1) Language
(the uses of language, informal fallacies, definition); (2) Deduction
(three chapters on the "traditional" and three on the "modern" view);
(3) Induction (analogy, probable inference, Mill's methods, hypothesis,
probability). Some of the individual sections are useful introductions
to logical and linguistic questions. Each chapter is amply provided
with exercises. Anyone who worked through the whole volume would
acquire facility in a variety of techniques. But he would not acquire
a coherent and connected logical theory; it would hardly occur to
him that such a theory is possible, let alone necessary. The three
main parts of the book are left standing side by side; and the
apportionment of material to them is often arbitrary. For example,
what the author claims to be a merit of his work, that definition
(and with it extension and intension) is treated as a matter of
language, and classification (division) as a matter of induction, is
just an illogicality. It illustrates the widespread misconception that

logical notions can be adequately dealt with apart from their *logical* context. When the theory of definition is no longer worked out in close connexion with the traditional theory of the predicables and the traditional theory of division, it gravitates to theory of language because "modern" logic has no genuine theory of the predicables. But neither can language provide us with a theory of the predicables, and the resultant dogmatism of recent views about definition cannot conceal the fact that a *general* theory of definition is prior to a theory of verbal definition, whether the latter be of words or uses of words or linguistic usage. Again, what is so linguistic about the so-called "informal" ("material") fallacies? Even those that appear to depend on straight-out linguistic confusion commonly turn out, on further analysis, to depend on a faulty premise of a rather special kind (in which case there is often no fallacy at all) or on an ordinary fallacy or on an equivocation between faulty premise and faulty argument. For that matter, why start with language at all? Admittedly the theory of logic has to be expounded by means of language, but so has the theory of language itself. To begin with language is to make the dubious assumption that a quite unsystematic study, a collection of observations about meaning and rhetoric and other topics (including logic) is a good introduction to a systematic study, or to what could be a systematic study.

The chapters on the traditional theory of deduction contain some of the customary faulty interpretations, e.g. the class-interpretation of the subject and predicate, the confusion of opposition and immediate inference, and avoid others, e.g. it is recognised that the theory of opposition is sound if propositions have genuine terms. The chapters on the modern theory of deduction contain rather less discussion and are considerably more uncritical, failing to take account of difficulties that have been recognised for at least fifty years. In the final section on induction Copi succeeds in presenting some of the issues clearly and fairly, but gives far too much space to the special applications of general principles. This is particularly the case in the final chapter.

T. A. ROSE.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(Mention in this list neither precludes nor guarantees later review.)

A SYNOPTIC INDEX TO THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY, 1900-1949. Edited by J. W. Scott. (Blackwell, 1954. viii + 205 + 127 pp.) Price (U.K.), £3.

Part I gives the names of all contributors of papers; under each name come the titles of his contributions, and in nearly all cases under the title is a synopsis of the argument. Almost without exception the authors cooperated in preparing these synopses. Part II is an index of subjects. The synopses vary in length, the average being about two hundred words, and are sufficient to give an idea of the line of thought. Altogether this *Index* is of great value to anyone who wants to study philosophical controversy in Britain during this half century.

PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS. By A. J. Ayer. (Macmillan, 1954. ix + 289 pp.) Price (U.K.), 18s.

Twelve essays which have appeared in various periodicals, on logic, metaphysics, moral philosophy, and theory of knowledge.

THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED, Etc. By John Austin. With an Introduction by H. L. A. Hart. (Library of Ideas, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1954. xxxi + 396 pp.) Price (U.K.), 12s. 6d.

MONARCHY, AND THREE POLITICAL LETTERS. By Dante. With an Introduction by Donald Nichol. (Library of Ideas, 1954. xxi + 121 pp.) Price (U.K.), 9s. 6d.

JOHN MILL AND RICHARD BENTLEY. By Adam Fox. (Blackwell, 1954. xii + 168 pp.) Price (U.K.), 25s.

Combines biography with an account of work on the text of the Greek Testament from 1675 to 1730.

PERSPECTIVES IN PHILOSOPHY. Essays by Members of the Department of Philosophy. (Ohio State University, 1953. iv + 146 pp.)

PERCEPTUALISTIC THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. By Peter Fireman. (Philosophical Library, 1954. 50 pp.) Price, $2.75.

JASPERS' METAPHYSICS. By Adolph Lichtigfeld. With a Foreword by Karl Jaspers. (Colibri Press, London, 1954. xviii + 120 pp.) Price (U.K.), 10s. 6d.

NOTES AND NEWS

The Congress and Annual General Meeting for 1954 were held in Sydney from August 20th to 25th. The programme was as follows:

Friday, August 20th:

8 p.m.—Presidential Address: Mr. J. L. Mackie, "Responsibility".

Saturday, August 21st:

10.30 a.m.—Mr. A. C. Jackson, "Is Idealism a Possible Theory?"

2.30 p.m.—Mr. C. D. Rollins, "Empirical Necessity".

Sunday, August 22nd:

3.30 p.m.—Discussion.

8 p.m.—Mr. C. B. Martin, "Incorrigibility".

Monday, August 23rd:

10.30 a.m.—Dr. S. E. Toulmin, "Is There a Fundamental Problem in Ethics?"

2.30 p.m.—Council Meeting.

Tuesday, August 24th:

10.30 a.m.—Professor John Anderson, "Logical Atomism".

2.30 p.m.—Discussion.

8 p.m.—Professor W. Anderson, "Recent Criticisms of the Organic Theory of the State".

Wednesday, August 25th:

10.30 a.m.—Discussion on "The Place of the History of Philosophy in Undergraduate Courses", opened by Professor A. Boyce Gibson.